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In a recent issue of the Yale Law Journal Professor Richard Falk
raises a number of questions about the lawfulness of the United States
role in Viet Nam.' The importance of some of these questions for the
direction of contemporary international laiw as well as for the appraisal
of the United States role in Viet Nam calls for continuing dialogue.
In analyzing the United States role in Viet Nam, Professor Falk
focuses on the problem of the international law of "internal war."2 He
indicates that "the central issue is whether an externally abetted in-
ternal war belongs in either of the traditional legal categories of war-
'civil' or 'international."' 3 In answering this question and the sub-
t Prof. Moore's article is a response to the arguments made by Prof. Richard Falk in
International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Narn, War, 75 YALE LJ. 1122
(1966). Prof. Falk's response to this article appears infra at 1095. Limitations of time re-
quired that we give Prof. Falk the last word.--eds.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A. 1959, Drew University; LL.B.
1962. Duke Law School; LL.M. 1965, Univ. of Illinois. Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School,
1965-66.
1. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE
L.J. 1122 (1966).
A condensation of Professor Falk's views carries some risk of distortion. The reader is
urged to consult Professor Falk's article before reading this reply.
My own views are elaborated and further documented in Moore, The Lawfulness of
Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam, 61 Am. J. IN-r'L L. 1 (190). Additional
background documentation supporting this view may be found in MIoore &- Underwood,
The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam, 112 Coxo. lRre.
14,943 (daily ed. July 14, 1966), reprinted in 5 DuQrEsiE L. Rrv. 235 (1967).
See also Alford, The Legality of American Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A Broader
Perspective, 75 YALE L.J. 1109 (1966); Partan, Legal Aspects of the Yietnam Conflict, 46
B.U.L. REv. 281 (1966); Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, G0 A!i. J. 1%-rL
L. 750 (1966).
2. Falk, supra note 1, at 1122.
3. Id.
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sidiary questions it poses Falk constructs a framework focused on as-
sistance in the context of civil strife. Analytically, as a tool for clari-
fying policy choices, he divides violent conflict into Type I conflict,
involving "the direct and massive use of military force by one political
entity across a frontier of another,"4 Type II conflict, involving "sub-
stantial military participation by one or more foreign nations in an
internal struggle for control,"'5 and Type III conflict, involving "in-
ternal struggle for control of a national society, the outcome of which
is virtually independent of external participation." He postulates that
while it is appropriate "to use force in self-defense" in Type I conflict,
in Type II conflict it is only "appropriate... to take off-setting military
action confined to the internal arena,"" and in Type III conflict "it is
inappropriate for a foreign nation to use military power to influence
the outcome." Professor Falk then characterizes the Viet Nam conflict
as Type III,10 but "if this position entailing non-participation is re-
jected,"'" it follows, according to Falk's view, that international law
prohibits United States participation in the Viet Nam conflict or at
least limits the maximum response to Type II counter-intervention
within the internal arena of South Viet Nam. 2
Although his critique is both scholarly and creative, the framework
proposed by Professor Falk is over-simplified for use in clarifying Viet
Nam policy choices. His resulting conclusions about the illegality of
the United States role in Viet Nam are unsound. The Viet Nam con-
flict is highly ambiguous and it begs the question to analyze it in a
framework for "civil strife."'13 Although generalization is a useful tool
for decision, a generalization that the Viet Nam conflict is either Type
II or Type III "civil strife" ignores features of the total context which
are crucial in any assessment of long run community common interest.
Viet Nam, while evidencing features of "civil strife," also evidences









12. Id. Professor Falk seems to retreat from the non-participation argument when he
later asserts: "International law offers no authoritative guidance as to the use of force
within South Viet Nam, but the bombing of North Viet Nam appears to be... a viola-
tion of international law." Id. 1155.
13. Professor Falk begins to beg the question in his second sentence when he says: "A
war is usefully classified as internal when violence takes places primarily within a single
political entity, regardless of foreign support for the contending factions. ' Id. 1122.
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missible use of force across de facto boundaries and cease-fire lines.
Analysis of the lawfulness of the United States role must consider this
total context in the light of the major community policies at stake.
Real-World Viet Nam: An Ambiguous Context
Both sides in the Viet Nam debate characteristically select from the
highly ambiguous context those features which reinforce their per-
ceptions of the conflict. The "White Papers"14 issued by the State De-
partment in 1961 and 1965 painted too one-sided a picture of the
conflict in not recognizing the extent of indigenous support for the
Viet Cong within South Viet Nam and in proclaiming a homespun
view of the failure to implement the election provisions of the Geneva
Accords. As a result, the White Paper model of "aggression from the
North" has never captured the complex reality of the Viet Nam prob-
lem. But similarly, critics of Viet Nam policy have also engaged in
this "model building." In characterizing the conflict as a "civil war"
and the United States role as "intervention," they focus on the features
of the context pointing to Vietnamese national unity, the ill-fated unity
and election provisions in the Accords, and the instability of govern-
ments in the South. In building this "civil war-intervention" model
critics characteristically do not focus on the very real ambiguities in
the Geneva settlement, the more than twelve year territorial, political
and ideological separation of the North and South, the existence
of a cease-fire line dividing North and South, and the close rela-
tions between Hanoi and the Viet Cong. Professor Falk's model es-
sentially reflects the critics' one-sided focus.15 As a result his first choice
characterization of the conflict as "an internal struggle for control of
a national society, the outcome of which is virtually independent of
external participation [Type III conflict]," is misleading for purposes
of evaluating the permissibility of United States assistance. The issues
in Viet Nam are not nearly so neat and tidy and no amount of "model
14. U.S. DEr'T OF STATE, A THREAT TO THE PEACE: NORTH VIEr-NA.'s ErFonr To CoN-
QUEt SoUTH Vmr-NA7M (1961); U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Accn sso. FRou Tim No'nr, TuE
RECORD OF NORTH Vir-NAm's CAMPAIGN To CONQUER SaomT VIT-NAz (1965) (reprinted
in 52 )EP'T STATE BULL. -44).
15. Professor Quincy Wright relies on a similar substantially one-sided fact selection in
building a "model" of the conflict as civil strife between Hanoi and Saigon. See Wright,
supra note 1, at 756-59.
it is somewhat uncertain whether Professor Falk's Type III characterization refers to
"civil strife" -within the South, "civil strife" bet-ween. North and South, or both. Although
he indicates that he regards "the war in South Vietnam primarily as a Type III conflict,"
much of the evidence which he relies on for this characterization seems to argue more tar
a North-South characterization. See Falk, supra note 1, at 1128-32. See also the North-
South arguments, id. at 1138 and 1153 and notes 45. 48 and 67 infra.
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building" will make them so. Real-world Viet Nam combines some
elements of civil strife (both within the South and between North
and South) with elements of the cold war divided nation problem and
"aggression from the North," all complicated by an uncertain inter-
national settlement. Because of the complexity of this total context,
neither the official nor critical models provides a sufficiently sensitive
analytic tool for clarifying policy choices in the conflict. The starting
-point for selection of important contextual features must be analysis
of the principal community values at stake.
A prominent feature of contemporary international law is the pro-
hibition of coercion in international relations as a strategy of major
change. The most widely accepted understanding of the requirements
of both customary international law and the United Nations Charter
-is that force pursuant to the right of individual or collective defense
.or expressly authorized by the centralized peacekeeping machinery of
the United Nations is lawful. Essentially all other major uses of force
are unlawful.16 These.norms reflect awareness both of the great destruc-
tiveness of war and of the necessity for the maintenance of defensive
-rights in a world divided between competing public order systems and
with only limited expectations toward the success of existing central-
ized.peace-keeping machinery. At a lower level .of generality customary
international law and the United Nations Charter outlaw major use
of military force to redress grievances, however deeply felt, in the
absence of major military attack on fundamental values such as po-
litical and territorial integrity. In the nuclear age it is usually better
that international disputes not be settled than that they be settled
by unilateral military strategies. And this is particularly true of disputes
between the major contending public order sytems, with their almost
unlimited potential for escalation and destruction. These community
norms also-reflect the judgment, evident as well in national law, that
when centralized peace-keeping machinery is not effectively available
it is necessary to preserve the right of defense to those attacked. In a
world in which power plays a large role in international affairs, this
right of defense is a major source of control and sanction against ag-
gression.17 As such, it may be crucial to conflict minimization that this
defensive right be maintained.
16. See M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELCIANO, LAW AND M N.NIuM Ioz.D Puntac ORa 121-260
(1961). See also McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems
of Public Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
17. See generally H. HAr, THE CoNcEPT OF L,w 208-31 (1963); H. Mo0R1LNxu-u,
PoLms AMONG NATIONS 293-96 (3d ed. 1966).
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In light of the critical values of world order at stake, conflict between
contending governments of a nation at least de facto divided into
continuing international entities and paying allegiance to contending
public order systems presents a problem of major international con-
cern. "Rational community policy must be directed to the coercive
interactions of territorially organized communities of consequential
size, whatever the 'lawfulness' of their origin."18 And this is particu-
larly true of boundaries separating major contending public order
systems. The balance of power makes the use of the military instrument
across such boundaries particularly hazardous, as both Korea and Viet
Nam have demonstrated. For the purposes of assessing the lawfulness
of coercion across such boundaries and the lawfulness of extending
assistance to the entity attacked, these real-world boundaries must be
recognized as such. The label "civil strife" must not be allowed to
obscure this major problem in conflict minimization. If we believe
that long-run community common interest in minimization of coer-
cion is against unilateral coercion across continuing de facto inter-
national boundaries and cease-fire lines, particularly when such bound-
aries separate the major cold war camps, then for purposes of policy
clarification about the lawfulness of force, conflict between North and
South Viet Nam is not "civil strife" regardless of other features of the
context evidencing similarity with "civil strife." The ambiguous 1954
Geneva settlement certainly differentiates Viet Nam from the other
divided nations of China, Germany and Korea, but the continuing
and at least de facto division of Viet Nam has a substantial parallel to
the cold war divided nation problem when analyzed with regard to
the vital policies of minimum world public order. It is in the long run
common interest not to permit change of existing and relatively per-
manent international divisions by unilateral military coercion however
unjust the existence of the condition may seem to the protagonist of
change. The Kashmir and Palestine disputes present additional con-
temporary examples of the importance of this principle.
As applied to Viet Nam, there is substantial evidence of the at least
de facto separateness of North and South, regardless of one's view of the
effect of the Geneva settlement. Thus, the State of Viet Nam (the pre-
decessor government of South Viet Nam) and the Democratic Republic
of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam) were to some extent separate de facto
states even prior to the Accords of 1954,10 and subsequent to the Ac-
18. M. MCDOUGAL & F. FEucuao, supra note 16, at 221 n22.
19. For discussion on this point see -Moore & Undernood, supra note 1, 112 Co.c. Rxc.
at 14,944.
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cords their real separateness became much stronger. Prior to the Ac-
cords each government was recognized by a number of states as the
government of Viet Nam and each carried on separate international
activities.2° Although nations had differing expectations from the
Geneva settlement, the major effect of the settlement was to consolidate
territorially the existing division of Viet Nam between the two rival
governments. South Viet Nam is now recognized by about 60 nations
and North Viet Nam by about 24, a recognition pattern closely ap-
proximating that of North and South Korea. 21 The substantial expecta-
tions of the separateness of North and South Viet Nam after the
Accords is indicated by the January, 1957 draft resolution of the
U.S.S.R., a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, calling for the
simultaneous admission to the United Nations of North Viet Nam,
South Viet Nam, North Korea and South Korea as four separate
"states." 22 Both North and South have clearly functioned for twelve
years since the Accords as separate international entities with govern-
mental institutions of their own operating along different ideological
lines. Both have long maintained separate foreign embassies and diplo-
matic representation, and have administered separate territories and
populations. That the contending governments claim sovereignty to
all of Viet Nam can hardly be decisive for purposes of conflict mini-
mization, as the situation is parallel in this respect to that in Korea,
China and Germany. Under the circumstances, this at least de facto
20. The State of Viet Nam had been recognized by about 30 to 35 states prior to the
Geneva settlement. See DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DISCUSSION OF KOREA AND INDO-CIIINA
AT THE GFNEvA CONFERENCE (Misc. No. 16) CMD No. 9186 (1964); 31 PARE. SESSIONAL
PAPERs 109, 133 (1953-54); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY-CURRENT Docu-
MENTS 121 n.3 (1958).
The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam had been recognized by the People's Republic of
China, the Soviet Union and a number of East European Nations. See B. MuRTI, VIETNAM
DIvIDED 171 (1964). See also ROYAL INSITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SURVEY OF INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949-50 429-30 (1953).
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LEGAL STATUS OF SOUTH VInr-NAM (4/31b-86511T).
South Korea has full relations with about 64 nations while North Korea is recognized by
about 25. Id.
22. See 11 U.N. GAOR Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 5-7 U.N. Doe, A/SPC/L.9
(1957).
During the debates on this and other draft resolutions calling for the admission of the
Republic of Viet Nam, the three Soviet delegates said between them:
[B]oth in Korea and in Viet-Nam two separate States existed, which differed from
one another in political and economic structure....
The fact was that there were two States in Korea and two States in Viet-Nam....
The realistic approach was to admit that there were two States with conflicting
political systems in both Korea and Viet-Nam. In the circumstances, the only possible
solution was the simultaneous admission of the four countries constituting Korea and
Viet-Nam....
[Two completely separate and independent States had been established in each of
those countries, [Korea and Viet Nam] with different political, social and economic
systems.
11 U.N. GAOR Spec. Pol. Comm. 79, 81, 87, 101 (1957).
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separation can not be ignored for meaningful clarification of policy
alternatives.
In addition to the continuing real-world division of Viet Nam, a
factor which exists as a crucial contextual feature regardless of any
interpretation of the Geneva settlement, North and South are also
divided by a military cease-fire line created by that settlement. In a
Special Report in 1962 the International Commission for Supervision
and Control in Viet Nam found that North Vietnamese military activ-
ity across that line was a specific violation of the Accords.2 Some critics
reply by pointing out that the Commission also found that South Viet
Nam violated the Accords by accepting American defensive aid. But
this neutral reporting proves little. The crucial question is whether
these indicated breaches should be treated alike for purposes of com-
munity policy about maintenance of world public order. The clear
answer is no. When put in context of community norms proscribing
the use of force for settlement of disputes, the indicated breach of the
North is exactly that kind of aggressive coercion proscribed, whereas
the indicated breach of the South is permitted defensive response to
such coercion. It is not at all anomalous in this context to assert that
the norm, material breach of agreement justifies suspension of cor-
responding obligations, is available as a defense to the South but not
the North.2 4 For even if the South did breach the election provisions
of the Accords, and there are serious questions here as to the legal
position of the South with respect to these provisions of the Accords,2
aggressive military strategies by the North are not a permitted response
to such breach. The point is that there is a major difference in char-
acter of the indicated breaches North and South which is crucial for
community policies of maintenance of minimum order and which is
inherent in overriding community norms as to the lawfulness of the
use of force. Failure to recognize this distinction is failure to grasp the
essential community policies against unilateral coercive change em-
bodied in the United Nations Charter. Rational community policy
concerned with conflict minimization must be concerned with coercion
across such international cease-fire lines. This is true regardless of the
23. SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERECE ON LNoO-ChuwA,
Cssn. No. 1755 (1962); 39 PAM. SESSIONAL PASERs 6-7 (1961-62).
24. Professor Falk fails to meet this point In criticizing the State Department's "breach
of agreement" argument he says: "One wonders why this 'international law principle' is
not equally available to North Viet Nama after Saigon's refusal even to consult about hold-
ing elections. Why is Hanoi bound by the reasoning of footnote 10 and Washington entitled
to the reasoning of reciprocal breach?" Falk, supra note 1, at 1154.
25. For discussion of these questions see Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance
to the Republic of Viet Nam, supra note 1.
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merits of the dispute between North and South with respect to the
Accords. Even if the underlying agreement created expectations de-
nied by one of the participants, community policies against force as a
strategy of change militate against resumption of hostilities. The exis-
tence of such an international cease-fire line in Viet Nam is another
particular feature casting doubt on the utility of characterization of the
conflict as an "internal struggle for control of a national society, the
outcome of which is virtually independent of external participation."
It is one of the paradoxes of the Viet Nam dialogue that both sides
rely on the 1954 Geneva settlement. In characterizing the Viet Nam
conflict as a Type III conflict, Professor Falk relies heavily on a model
of the Geneva settlement which he pictures as basically creating ex-
pectations of short run unification of Viet Nam under the government
of Ho Chi Minh, although he admits "the intentions of the partici-
pants at Geneva were somewhat ambiguous."'20 The subsequent United
States role in assisting the South, according to this model, "contrasts
radically" with "the expectations created at Geneva."27' There are
factors in the manifold of events constituting the Geneva settlement
that point to such a conclusion. Chief among them are Articles 6 and
7, the "no boundary" and "election" provisions of the Final Declara-
tion. These provisions suggest that at least those participants agreeing
to the Final Declaration expected that Viet Nam would be united by
elections in 1956 and that the division was to be temporary. But the
language of the Final Declaration is not the only source for ascertain-
ing the genuine expectations of all the participants and in this case
may be unreliable. There are at least equally important factors in the
context of the Geneva settlement that cast serious doubt on the legiti-
26. Falk, supra note 1, at 1129. This theme runs all through Professor Falk's critique
and constitutes one of his major assumptions. By way of some representative statements:
My own judgment, based on the analysis of the Geneva settlement in 1954, is that
the war in South Viet Nam represents more an American attempt at "rollback" than
a Communist attempt at "expansion." The Geneva Conference looked toward the re-
unification of the whole of Viet Nam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. The
introduction into South Viet Nam of an American military presence thus appears as
an effort to reverse these expectations and to deny Hanoi the full extent of its victory
against the French. Id. 1125 n.15.
Hanoi was "entitled" to prevent Saigon from establishing itself as a political entity
with independent claims to diplomatic status as a sovereifn state. A separation of Viet
Nam into two states was not contemplated by the participants at Geneva. Id. at 1130
n.31.
[The injection of an American political and military presence was, from the pers-
pective of Hanoi, inconsistent with the whole spirit of Geneva. The United States
decision to commit itself to maintaining a Western-oriented regime in South Viet Nam
upset the expectations regarding the Southeast Asian balance of power . . . . Id. 1138.
The strength of Hanoi's claim [to exercise control over the South] arises from . . .
the expectations created at Geneva that the elections would confirm that military
victory . . . .Id. 1138 n.66.
27. Id. 1131.
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macy of placing major reliance on alleged short run expectations of
Hanoi with respect to unification of Viet Nam. These are factors to
which Falk does not advert in constructing his model.
The memoirs of Anthony Eden°-s and the preliminary seven point
program agreed to by the United States and the United Kingdom and
apparently supported by French Prime Minister Mendes-France-
strongly suggest that the real core of the settlement, at least from a
Western standpoint, was partition of Viet Nam between the two major
contending public order systems, a division to some extent shared by
the Vietnamese people. In fact, Eden, the individual Chairman of the
Conference, was a chief proponent of partition although Eisenhower
indicated concern because of the loss of the North to "Communist
enslavement." 30 Nowhere does Eden indicate that he felt he had failed
to set up a permanent barrier between Ho Chi Minh and Malaya, one
of his chief concerns.31 The Survey of International Affairs 1954, pub-
lished by the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, has this
account of the Viet Minh position at the Conference:
On 25 May the Viet Minh Foreign Minister, Mr. Dong, put for-
ward a detailed plan, which was clearly in the nature of a first ap-
28. A. EDEN, FULL Cmcr.x (1960). Eden writes that prior to the conference "it .. .
seemed inevitable that large parts of the country would fall under Communist control.
and the best hope of a lasting solution lay in some form of partition." Id. 117. And "I
felt that the Chinese might yet be constrained to come to an arrangement which would ...
allow a free life to some part of Vietnam ... ." Id. 137. And "I decided to persevere
at our next meeting [with Chou En-lail with my plan for what I called the 'protective
pad.' Many countries had an interest in this and, if I could once get the conception
established, the position might hold, perhaps for )ears.. . . It would be best if com-
munism could be ...halted as far north as possible in Vietnam." Id. 138. And Eden
writes that after the Conference "The Vietnamese had saved more of their country than
had at one time seemed possible. ... In the months ahead the United States would be
playing a greater part in all their [Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos] destinies." Id. 160.61.
See also id. 97, 101-02, 148-49, 156-57.
29. See id. 149, 156-57. Under the terms of this program the United States and the
United Kingdom agreed "to respect an armistice agreement on Indo-China which:
2. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave
in the delta ....
3. Does not impose on ... retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impair-
ing... [its] capacity to maintain [a] stable non-Communist regime ....
4. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained
area to Communist control ....
Id. 149. According to Eden, M. Mendes-France supported this program. Eden writes that
Mendes-France "described to us his negotiations with the Vietminh on the question of
the demarcation line in Vietnam and effectively demonstrated that at no point had his
position diverged from the minimum terms which had been defined by the Americans
and ourselves." Id. 156.
30. "To me these French proposals ... implied nothing else but partition. We knew,
from experience in Korea, that this would probably lead to Communist enslavement of
millions in the northern partitioned area." D. EtSEUNHOWE, MAANDATE FOR CHANCE 432
(Signet ed. 1963).
31. A. EDN, FuLL CincLE 97 (1960).
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proximation to the "accepting price" of the insurgents .... This
plan was, clearly, rather more than a proposal for a regroupment
of forces; if put into effect it would in fact provide something like
a de facto military partition of the country, and one that, with its
provision that the two areas chosen should be economically viable,
seemed to be envisaged as lasting for some time.82
The public record indicates that the South Vietnamese government
opposed partition and supported provisional control by the United
Nations of all of Viet Nam pending free elections.33 Their refusal to
agree to the political provisions of the settlement is consistent with
expectations on their part that those provisions would be unworkable
from their standpoint and that the agreement would actually result in
de facto partition. Moreover, France had entered into a series of in-
dependence agreements with the State of Viet Nam, the predecessor
government of South Viet Nam, prior to the conclusion of the Indo-
China phase of the Geneva Conference 34 and French Foreign Minister
Bidault indicated at the Conference that the State of Viet Nam was
independent and that it was "fully and solely competent to commit
Viet Nam."'35 Both the separate presence of the State of Viet Nam and
these statements of the French delegate at the Conference suggest that
32. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 194
48 (1957). And see Do VANG LY, AGGRESSIONS BY CHINA 151 (2d ed. 1960).
The actual proposal made by the Vietminh Chief Delegate, Mr. Dong, on Mlay 24 was.
The readjustment is made on the basis of an exchange of territory, the following
elements to be taken into consideration: area, population, political and economic
interests so as to accord each party zones all of a piece, relatively widespread and
offering facilities for economic activities and administrative control respectively within
each zone. The demarcation line between these zones should as much as possible
not create communication and transport difficulties within the respective zones.
Ngo Ton Dat, The Geneva Partition of Vietnam and the Question of Reunification
During the First Two Years 163 (1963) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Univ.).
The author accompanied the Vietnamese Prime Minister to the Geneva negotiations. He
sums up this Vietminh proposal as: "Clearly Mr. Dong's declaration could only mean one
thing: the partition of Vietnam." Id.
33. See "The News In Review," United Nations Review 2 (Vol. 1, July 1954). Moore &
Underwood, supra note 1, 112 CONG. Rxc. at 14981 n.267.
34. See Moore & Underwood, supra note 1, 112 CONG. REc. 14,969-70 nn.22, 23, 33, 06,
41. Like most of the context surrounding the Conference, these agreements were
ambiguous and seem not in fact to have effectuated complete independence to the State
of Viet Nam prior to the conclusion of the Conference. But taken together these agree-
ments did provide some status to the State of Viet Nam as an international entity in its
own right. For a restrictive interpretation of the effect of the agreement Initialed on
June 4, 1954 see Weinstein, Vietnam's Unheld Elections 12-14 (1966) (Data Paper No. 60,
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell Univ.).
Ngo Ton Dat seems to conclude that the State of Viet Nam was not bound by the
Accords since the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces did not have a sufficient
delegation of power from the State of Viet Nam to conclude a "general armistice of vital
importance." See Ngo Ton Dat, supra note 32, at 303-10.
35. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DISCUSSION OF KOREA AND INDO-CHINA AT TIrE GENEVA
CONFERENCE (Misc. No. 16) CNID. No. 9186 (1954); 31 PARt,. SESSIONAL PAPERS 108-09, 132-84(1953-54).
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France did not intend to bind the State of Viet Nam by the political
provisions of the Final Declaration. In the face of this French position
at the Conference and the clear refusal of the State of Viet Nam to
adhere to the political provisions of the agreements, 30 the experienced
diplomats at the Conference must have been aware of the possibility
that few provisions other than cease-fire and partition would be carried
out.3 7 In this regard it is significant that even prior to the Conference
the State of Viet Nam was recognized by about thirty states and had
been endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a
state qualified for membership.38 Professor Falk himself somewhat in-
consistently points out that "at the time of the Geneva proceedings,
the Saigon regime exerted control over certain areas in the South, and
this awkward fact made it unrealistic to suppose that the Geneva terms
of settlement would ever be voluntarily carried out."3 9
Some of the terms of the settlement and the fact that the Final Decla-
ration of the Conference which contained the political settlement pro-
visions was unsigned also suggest that the real settlement was partition
or at least that the parties were never really agreed on much but a
territorial division and cease-fire. The key to unification would clearly
be the election provisions, which were surprisingly vague for so im-
portant a question. The only reference to elections in the signed Agree-
ment on the Cessation of Hostilities appears in Article 14(a) and reads
in full: "Pending the general elections which will bring about the
unification of Viet Nam ... ." The unsigned Final Declaration of the
Conference adverts to the election problem only in the three sentences
of paragraph seven.40 The first two sentences are unclear -and add little
36. See CoUcIL ON FOREIGN RE.AuONS, THE UNrrno STATES iN WoRL AFrAms 1954
252-53 (1956).
37. According to P. J. Honey of the University of London:
In signing the agreements they [the Vietnamese Communists] were forced to bow to
strong Soviet pressure, a fact that robbed them of mucl prestige at home, and the
only face-saving concession made to them was the unsigned "Declaration of Inten-
tion," which prescribed national elections for the reunification of Vietnam. to be held
not later than July 1956. The worthlessness of this concession can be seen in a remark
made by the Communist North Vietnam (DRV) Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, to
one of my Vietnamese friends immediately after the signing of the agreements. When
asked which side he thought would win the elections, Dong replied, "You know as
well as I do that there won't be any elections."
P. HONEY, Co.rmuNIsm IN NORTm VrmTrAu: ITs ROLE IN rim SIxO-SOvLEr DIsPrUrE 5.6 (1966).
See also id. 67. But see weinstein, supra note 34, at 17-18 n.71.
38. 7 U.N. GAOR Annexes, Agenda Item No. 19, at 10, U.N. Doe. A/2341 & Corr. 1
(1952); 7 U.N. GAOR 410 (1952).
39. Falk, supra note 1, at 1152. He also writes: "In a sense it was naive of Hanoi to
accept the Geneva arrangement or to rely upon its implementation." Id.
40. See FURTHER DocU mENirs RELATING TO THE DISCUSSION or LNDO.CMNA AT TILE GENEVA
CONFERENCE (AMisC. No. 20) CMD. No. 9239 (1954); 31 PAR.. SESSIoNAL. PAPEIyS 9-11
(1953-54); 161 BarrTSH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERs 359-61 (1954).
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beyond a date for elections and the general composition of a super-
visory commission, and the third sentence leaves the monumental
problems to be solved by future consultations between the "representa-
tive authorities of the two zones ... ." one of which was already pub-
licly declaring that it would refuse to be bound by these provisions.
This cavalier treatment of the political settlement must be considered
a major weakness of the settlement and suggests that the parties were
aware of the possibility of an extended partition in Viet Nam. In con-
trast, the signed military cease-fire agreement dealt in great detail with
provisions for a continuing cease-fire, and the central feature of the
settlement was the division of Viet Nam between two essentially eco-
nomically viable and at least de facto international entities. The major
real impact of the settlement was to stop the fighting and to rein-
force an already existing political division. The provisions for allowing
initial transfer of civilians between zones4' also suggest continuing
partition and are difficult to reconcile with genuine expectations of
short run unification by election. In large part they reflected Western
concern about loss of the North to Communism and a desire to enable
non-Communists in the North to opt for a non-communist system in
the South. Victor Bator makes much the same point with respect to the
ambiguities of the settlement. According to Bator:
The contradictions and the equivocations in the documents
that emerged from the Geneva Conference gain added emphasis by
the procedure by which they were reached. As narrated in memoirs
such as those of Anthony Eden, who presided at Geneva, or in the
detailed accounts of Bernard B. Fall, Jean Lacouture, and Phil-
ippe Devillers, partition-so ambiguously treated in the docu-
ments-was the most important subject of bargaining, both in
principle and in its geographical application. It was discussed con-
tinually, if confidentially within each delegation, but for a time
was carefully ignored when the delegations met.
When at last partition was openly breached by the Vietminh,
the French and British were elated. From that moment the loca-
tion of the dividing line became the principal hurdle blocking
the road to a settlement. Secretary of State Dulles, in order to
underscore his insistence that it be drawn on the 17th parallel and
to demonstrate western unity on this point, flew from Washington
to Paris to meet with Eden and Premier Pierre Mendes-France.
There were discussions even about the viability of the two parts.
It is hard to believe that all this activity could have been devoted
41. See Article 14(d) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam,
July 20, 1954, and Article 8 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 21,
1954, in SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 89TH CONG. lST SESs., BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RELATING TO SouTHrEAsT ASIA AND VIETNAM 32, 59 (rev. ed. June 16, 1965).
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to the location of a temporary military demarcation line, a kind of
billeting arrangement that would shortly disappear. The innocent-
sounding text of the final agreement must have signified some-
thing of greater import.-"
There is also evidence in the ambiguous context surrounding the Con-
ference which points to the conclusion that Hanoi placed reliance on
elections being held in 1956.43 A review of the negotiations at Geneva,
42. Bator, Geneva; 1954: The Broken Mold, Tan RPomr, June 30, 1966, at 15, 17.
Bator also writes:
The primary motivation of the Vietminh was to consolidate their rule zomewhcre,
anywhere, in Vietnam. To accomplish this, Ho Chi Minh was willing to make political
concessions from his militarily superior position. So it came about that, on May 25,
the head of the Vietminh delegation first mentioned partition. It wras to be based on
a regrouping of forces on either side of a line of demarcation that would give both
parties an area with a sufficiently large population to exist independently.
Id. at 17. See also B. FALL, Viar-NtA WriaEss 75-76, 123 (1966); Docusmsars RErIxnxo To
TE DiscussioN OF KOREA AND INDO-CH NA AT THE GEvEvA Cos'rrNTEaCa (Misc. No. 16)
CrmD. No. 9186 (1954) (record of Conference discussions); FuaImai Docu.%'mrs R.LATLN'G
To THE DISCUSSION OF INDO-CHINA AT THE G£\EVA CONFERENCE (OMisC. No. 20) CMD. NO.
9239 (1954); 31 Par.. SESsIONAL PAPERS (1953-54).
Lacouture candidly points out:
A great deal of confusion surrounds this Geneva settlement. It must be emphasized
that the only texts signed at Geneva were the armistice agreements between the French
and the Vietminh. No one at all signed the "final declaration" of the conference--
both the United States and South Vietnam had reservations about it-and it carried
only the force of suggestion. But apart from the North Vietnamese, the French were
the only nation that formally guaranteed to carry out the Geneva accords that pro-
vided both for partition at the 17th parallel and for elections.
Laouture, Vietnam: The Lessons of War, Hearings on S. 2793 Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1. at 655, 656-57 (1966).
Ellen Hammer says of the political settlement provisions of the "Accords":
[a]lthough the Franco-Vietminh war was ended at Geneva in July 1954, a political
solution for Vietnam was posponed to some unspecified future date.
The agreements outlined at Geneva ...contained few if any provisions for their
long-term execution. They were a series of desires for the future, drawn up by the
conference participants.
E. HAmM.ER, VIETNAM YESTERDAY AND TODAY 247 (1966).
43. See Weinstein, supra note 34. See also G. KHn. & J. LEvwS, Tim UNn'D STATES In
VwmrnAm 43-65 (1967).
These scholars argue that Hanoi placed major reliance on the election provisions and
assert a model of the Geneva settlement which de-emphasizes the ambiguities in the politi-
cal settlement. Interestingly, Kahin and Lewis point out that Dulles indicated in his press
statement shortly after the Conference that now the United States could build up "the
truly independent states of Cambodia, Laos and southern Vietnam:' Id. 61. They con-
cluded that SEATO "signalled the American intent to underwrite a separate state in
southern Vietnam if, despite the inadmissibility of this under the Geneva Agreements, one
could be established." Id. 63. The authors, however, fail to draw the inference that
the immediate inclusion of "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet-
nam" within the protection of Article IV of the SEATO Treaty, strongly indicated
Western expectations that the Geneva settlement would lead to a non-communist South
Viet Nam. It should be recalled that Britain and France were also parties to SEATO.
Jean Lacouture points out that Mendes-France addressed a letter to the Saigon leaders
the day after the Geneva negotiations "assuring them that France would not recognize
another trustee of Vietnam's sovereignty" and ending "any chance of political co-operation
between Paris and Hanoi." He refers to this letter and the signing of the SEATO Treaty
on the day after Geneva as the two shadows quickly darkening the Geneva Agreement.
These and subsequent actions of the British, French, Soviet and United States govern-
ments support an interpretation that partition wras the core of the agreements. See
J. LAcoUTURE, VinrA.,: BETEEN Two TRcs 11-12 (Vintage ed. 1966).
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however, suggests that the core of the settlement was the partition and
cease-fire and that the major agreement came when both sides accepted
partition as the basis for settlement. There was substantially less agree-
ment on the political settlement provisions and at least the British,
American and State of Viet Nam governments were opposed to these
provisions, which they feared would work in practice to jeopardize
maintenance of a non-communist South. The State of Viet Nam and
the United States indicated to the Conference participants that they
would not consider themselves bound by these provisions. In light of
the major feature of the settlement-a de facto division between two
contending governments-and the expressed negative attitudes toward
the political settlement provisions by other major participants at the
Conference, there is serious doubt about the reasonableness of placing
great reliance on the election provision.
The totality of evidence suggests that the Western nations, particu-
larly the United States and Britain, desired that the settlement would
lead to a non-communist South and expected that it had some chance
of doing so, that the Vietminh desired that the settlement would lead
to unification under Northern control and may have expected that
takeover by political settlement or military activities would be feasible
if the regime in the South proved nonviable, and that the Diem govern-
ment expected that the agreement would lead to de facto partition
because the election provisions were unacceptable to them. Fair in-
terpretation of the settlement should take into account not only as-
serted expectations of the North, but also the contrary expectations of
the United States and the State of Viet Nam at the time of the settle-
ment which were communicated to all participants.
The later Soviet lack of concern toward the non-implementation of
the political settlement provisions and the Soviet attempt to admit
both North and South Viet Nam to the United Nations reinforces the
substantial evidence that partition was the core of the settlement.
The point is that there seem to have been only minimal shared ex-
pectations on the political settlement, and that because of this ambi-
guity it is particularly unreasonable to assert the "Accords" as a
justification for North Vietnamese military activities when de facto
partition did result.44
When viewed in context there is considerable doubt as to the com-
pleteness of the model of the Geneva settlement relied on by Professor
44. For a detailed treatment of the background of the Conference and the negotiations
leading up to the settlement, see Ngo Ton Dat, supra note 32.
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Falk in characterizing the conflict as Type III. It seems implicit in
much of his argument for this characterization that North and South
are one international entity.4 But the total manifold of events sur-
rounding the settlement suggests that partition was the real core of the
settlement. And there can be little doubt that in its total context the
political settlement was highly ambiguous. This very ambiguity rein-
forces the danger to world order inherent in the North attempting to
force its asserted expectations by use of the military instrument.
It is perhaps not unimportant that the continuing division of Viet
Nam between governments of conflicting ideologies significantly
reflects a traumatic split among the Vietnamese people as well as be-
tween East and West. The 1954 settlement and continued division
have provided an opportunity for the Vietnamese people to choose
systems, an opportunity principally taken advantage of by a flood of
refugees from North to South.40 Under the circumstances it is difficult
to see the inequity in treating the two divisions as entities whose peo-
45. Although Professor Falk's Type III characterization is in his terms a characteriza-
tion of "the war in South Vietnam," most of the considerations listed by him as leading
him to so regard the conflict, such as Ho Chi Minh's asserted expectations from the
Geneva settlement, asserted United States neglect of opportunities to negotiate with Hanoi,
and the economic strain on Hanoi when relations between the North and South were
not normalized, seem implicitly to argue that the conflict is a Type III conflict between
the North and South. This suggestion that Falk is in effect substantially arguing that the
conflict is civil strife between North and South is reinforced by the notable lack in his
stated considerations of any analysis of the degree of independence of the Viet Cong.
In the absence of any real analysis of the relationship between Hanoi and the Viet
Cong, particularly of the important questions of extent of military interaction prior to
the first substantial increase in United States forces in late 1961, and prior to the com-
mencement of regular bombing of the North in February, 1965, Falk's characterization of
the conflict as Type III within South Viet Nam is unconvincing. In fact, most of the
considerations which he relies on seem to indicate on their face that Hanoi's role is a
major one in the total picture. See Falk, supra note 1, at 1127-32, 1137-38, 1151-52, 1158.
See infra notes 48, 67.
46. According to the Fourth Interim Report of the International Control Commission,
by July 20, 1955, 892,876 had moved from the North to the South and only 4,269 had
moved from the South to the North under Article 14(d). Founmt L'rrimm Rrrotr OF TiE
INTERNATIONAL COM'.ISSION FOR SUPERvISION AND CONTROL IN VlErNAm (Vietnan No. 3)
Cm. No. 9654 (1955); 45 PAm.. SEssioNL PAfxPS 30, App. IV (1955-56).
These figures seem incomplete but the ratio of civilians going South to those going
North probably remained about 10 to 1. This ratio resulted despite what one scholar has
termed the "co-ordinated campaign of obstruction instituted by the authorities of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam against persons wishing to move to the south." Dai,
Canada's Role in the International Commission for Supenrision and Control in Vietnam,
4 CAN. YB. INT'L L. 161, 168 (1965).
According to Anthony Eden, "There were some indications of a greater willingness in
Vietnam to face partition. There was no love lost betveen north and south. We felt that
the distress at amputation might prove more apparent than real" A. En,, FuLL CI CE
101 (1960).
P. J. Honey writes:
[A]ntagonism of long standing exists between the peoples of North and South
Vietnam. The halves were divided for roughly two hundred years between the end
of the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth centuries--the dividing line was re-
markably close to the present one-and a state of war existed between them.
P. HONEY, supra note 37, at 18.
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ples are entitled to freely express their own preferences in regard to
governmental institutions and unification. The conclusion "civil strife"
obscures serious inquiry about this question of which territorially
organized communities in Viet Nam ought to have their own right to
self-determination today. Harrison Salisbury's New York Times re-
ports on the relation between the N.L.F. and Hanoi indicate that even
North Viet Nam concedes, at least publicly, -some right to short run
southern self-determination. 47 The seriousness with which the South
Vietnamese Constituent Assembly functions is an indication of the
substantiality of these expectations within the South. The continuing
territorial separation of North and South, compounded by the ideo-
logical split among the Vietnamese people, has understandably given
rise to significant expectations of individualized self-determination in
the North and South. Under these circumstances it is at least as reason-
able to regard both North and South as entities whose peoples are now
entitled to their own self-determination about political institutions
and unification as to view North and South as one entity for these
purposes. 48
47. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
Brian Crozier points out that:
"he circumstances of the Vietnamese drive to the south, the distance between
Saigon and Hanoi, and the difficulty of pre-air age communications have all fostered
separatist sentiment in the south. For about 200 years, until the close of the eighteenth
century, Vietnam was divided into mutually hostile halves roughly coinciding with
the present division. This, too, colours the view that the current troubles are just
another civil war.
B. CaozxFa, Sotrr-EAsT AsIA IN TuiloIL 135 (Pelican rev. ed. 1966).
At least one Vietnamese observer wrote in 1963: "South Vietnam has a large anti.
Communist majority. And if the people of South Vietnam can really cast a free vote, it
is a foregone conclusion that the Vietnamese nationals will win." Ngo Ton Dat, supra
note 32, at 385.
48. Although the evidence on which Professor Falk relies to characterize the conflict
as Type III seems to argue implicitly for characterization as Type III between North
and South, he somewhat inconsistently places major reliance on characterization as Type
III within South Viet Nam. But the evidence as related at pp. 1070-73 infra, simply does
not support characterization of the conflict as Type III within South Viet Nam. For even
if the insurgency in the South was initially an indigenous reacton to the oppressive
measures of the Diem government, a proposition on which scholars differ, compare D. PiKE,
V=r CoNo 53, 80, 321 (1966) with G. KAHN & J. LEwis, supra note 43, at 119, and B. FALL,
Virr NAM WiTNmss 130-32 (1966), the evidence indicates that the Viet Cong were receiving
assistance from Hanoi prior to the first significant increase in United States forces over
pre-insurgency levels. As is evident in the writings of such Viet Nam scholars as Crozier,
Fall, Lacouture, Pike, Schlesinger and Warner, there is general agreement that by 1901
Hanoi had entered the war and was assisting the Viet Cong. See note 67 infra. Pike indi-
cates that by conservative estimate about 1,900 NLF cadres infiltrated from the North
in the period from 1954 through 1960 and that in 1961, 3,700 more entered the South.
But there is also general agreement that prior to 1961 the United States had only a very
limited Military Assistance Advisory Group in South Viet Nam-probably not more than
abotili 800-900, and that the first substantial increase in United States forces began in late
1961 with the rapid buildup of military advisory personnel, as recommended by the
Taylor-Rostow report. Kahin and Lewis indicate that the major increase in United States
assistance over pre-insurgency levels took place in early 1962. See G. KAniN & J. Lws,
supra note 43, at 77-78, 137. Apparently it was also in late 1961 and early 1962
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Armed Attack and Defensive Response
Professor Falk argues alternatively that at most Viet Nam is a Type
II conflict involving "substantial military participation by one or more
foreign nations in an internal struggle for control." 40 In this alterna-
tive characterization of the conflict he is apparently focusing the con-
flict as "civil strife" within the South substantially assisted by northern
military participation, rather than as "civil strife" between North and
South. If, of course, North and South Viet Nam could be treated as one
nation for the purpose of characterizing the conflict as "civil strife," it
would be inconsistent to contend that the bombing of the North is an
impermissible attack on a separate assisting state. Apparently focusing
on "civil strife" within the South, then, Falk contends that "the United
States could legitimately give military assistance to Saigon, but is ob-
ligated to limit the arena of violence to the territory of South Viet
Nam." 50 He argues that it is impermissible to treat North Vietnamese
assistance to the insurgents in the South as an armed attack justifying
a defensive response against the North."' This analysis disarmingly
fails to separate the relevant intellectual task of description of past
trends in decision from that of appraisal of alternatives. Although the
is and the ought are both component elements of "law," intellectual
clarification requires that the scholar differentiate widespread com-
munity expectations about law (whether of the is or the ought and
whether evidenced by the practices of states or the writings of publi-
cists, etc.) from his own personal policy recommendations. But though
Professor Falk argues as policy recommendation that it ought to be the
law, he cites no authority for his thesis that in what he calls a Type II
conflict it is appropriate to take off-setting military action only if con-
fined to the internal arena.
that the United States first began direct military support with the use of helicopter units
to ferry Vietnamese troops into combat. The testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the first United States military
casualty in South Viet Nam occurred in December, 1961, is indicative of the relatively
small military role played by the United States prior to late 1961. Tim V&rr NAM HAmNGS
263 (Vintage ed. 1966). A juxtaposition in time sequence of assistance rendered by both
sides indicates that the United States did not significantly expand its assistance over pre-insurgency levels prior to the critical impetus given the conflict by Hanoi's increasing
assistance and direction. The increase in United States forces was a response to the
quickening pace of the war and the increasing assistance from Hanoi. To characterize the
conflict as Type I within the South for the purpose of asserting the illegality of this
offsetting United States response at a time when the Viet Cong were dearly receiving
increasing assistance from Hanoi is meaningless.
49. Falk, supra note I, at 1126, 1127, 1132.
50. Id. 1132.
51. See id. 1136, 1140, 1150-51. This argument is crudal to Professor Falk's thesis.
He writes: "South Viet Ngm would have had the right to act in self-defense if an armed
attack had occurred, and the United States would then have had the right to act in collec-
tive self-defense." Id. 1140.
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In the absence of substantial authority, his conclusion that the
bombing of the North "appears to be... a violation of international
law' 52 (emphasis added) is somewhat mysterious, particularly since he
elsewhere qualifies this thesis by a footnote reference that this "asser-
tion.., must be qualified to the extent that the United States decision
to bomb North Viet Nam is treated as a law-creating precedent....
Candor requires acknowledgment that just as the problem of external
assistance to the internal arena is unclear there are no "authoritative"
rules of international law prohibiting the bombing of the North. More-
over, although international law may have great gaps in this area, in
the context of Viet Nam there is greater reason to believe both as a
matter of the is and the ought that the bombing of the North is a per-
missible defensive response.
There are two principal issues with respect to the legitimacy of
defensive response against externally initiated or assisted insurgency.
First, the question of whether off-setting assistance within the internal
arena is legitimate and second, whether response against the territory
of the assisting entity is legitimate. As Falk's proposed restriction of the
armed attack test indicates, the armed attack inquiry is principally
responsive to the second of these. It may be that assistance may be pro-
vided to the government forces in order to off-set external military
assistance provided to the insurgents even in the absence of an armed
attack as long as such assistance is confined to the internal arena. This
distinction seems implicit in Falk's conclusion for Type II conflicts. It
would mean that the United States could provide off-setting assistance
to South Viet Nam even in the absence of an armed attack and that the
question of whether there has been an armed attack is only relevant
with respect to interdictive attacks against the North. But if this is the
principal relevance of the armed attack test to the "internal war" situ-
ation then existing authority about armed attack suggests that defensive
response against the North is permissive. Professor Kelsen suggests that
this is the rule when he says:
Since the Charter of the United Nations does not define the
term "armed attack" used in article 51, the members of the United
Nations in exercising their right of individual or collective self-
defense may interpret "armed attack" to mean not only an action
52. Id. 1155.
53. Id. 1123 n.5. Although Professor Falk concludes that "international law offers
no authoritative guidance as to the use of force within South Viet Nam," strangely he
does not seem to find even equal uncertainty with respect to his thesis that in Type II
conflict it is appropriate to take offsetting military action only if confined to the internal
arena. See id. 1155.
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in which a state uses its own armed force but also a revolutionary
movement which takes place in one state but which is initiated
or supported by another state.54
And Professor Browniie supports this interpretation that there need
not be a "direct invasion" to constitute an armed attack.' 5
For reasons of national interest or strategy inherent in the balance
of power, states may choose only rarely to reply against the territory of
an entity assisting insurgents, as the Spanish Civil War demonstratedco
Moreover, if the assistance to insurgents is not militarily substantial
(and that is frequently the case) it may not amount to an armed attack.
But there is nothing inherent in the armed attack test which restricts
this right of response to instances of overt invasion. Yet that would be
substantially the consequence of Professor Falk's proposal.
The purpose of the armed attack requirement in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter is to restrict the right to use force in individual
or collective defense to very serious situations in which there is no
reasonable alternative to the use of force for the protection of major
values. By such requirements, contemporary international law ex-
presses the judgment that minor encroachments on sovereignty, politi-
cal disputes, frontier incidents, the use of non-coercive strategies of
interference, and generally minor aggression which does not threaten
fundamental values such as political and territorial integrity, may not
be defended against by major resort to force against another entity.
These tests are simply representative of the community interest in
restricting intense responding coercion to those situations where funda-
mental values are seriously threatened by coercion. 7 Such coercive
54. Kelsen, Collective Security Under International Law, 49 INrL LAw STUDI S 88
(1956). Kelsen also points out that "Participation of a state, with its armed forces, in
the civil war within another state on the side of the insurgents is certainly international
war in the relationship between the two states concerned." H. KELSEN, Rr&Wr Tnin's IN
THE LAW OF TE UNITED NATIONS 935 (1951). See also H. KEts.N, Tim LAw or FTim Ur;nm
NATIONS 798 (1950).
55. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UsE oF FoRCE By STATES 373 (1963).
Brownlie clearly seems to assume that foreign assistance to insurgents can constitute an
"armed attack." Id. at 327. He seems to adopt an "agency and control" test for armed
attack in the civil strife context. Id. at 370-73. Although he adverts to the desirability of
confining defensive measures to the territory of the defending state, his discussion does
not rule out response against the territory of an assisting state in the face of a major
threat. Id. at 327, 372-73.
56. See generally N. PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND Dixr oAc is TimE SPAIaS
Civr . SEr (1939). Cf. A. Tno,,s &- A. THomAs, NoN-IIt.-vENTiON 225 (196):
Such recognition, [German and Italian recognition of the insurgents as the legitimate
government] being premature, was an illegal intervention and following it the
Spanish war was converted from a civil war to an international war, and it should
then have been treated as such. To apply the rules of international law devised to
deal with insurgency to an international war is a great misuse of the law.
57. See Mf. MODou.AL S& E. FELctIANo, LAw AND MIN.MUM WOR. PUBuc ORwr 259
(1961).
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threats to fundamental values can be effectuated as realistically by
covert invasion and significant military assistance to insurgents as by
armies on the march.
In the Viet Nam context the evidence strongly suggests that Hanoi
provided significant military leadership and assistance to the Viet
Cong from about 1959-60, an assistance which has greatly increased
since then. Bernard Fall's account of the beginning of the Second Indo-
China war in The Two Viet-Nams18 suggests that the insurgency was
substantially under the control of the Communist party apparatus even
in the early years and that the National Liberation Front was sub-
stantially interrelated with Hanoi. By way of some relevant observa-
tions by Fall, certainly a qualified observer:
A last rationale for the autonomous rise of a resistance move-
ment in South Viet-Nam, advanced notably by the French writer
Philippe Devillers, is that "the insurrection existed before the
Communists decided to take part, and that they were simply forced
to join in" by Diem's oppressive measures. Devillers, however,
advances no evidence to the effect that the movement was not
taken in hand by Hanoi later, precisely because it had a popular
character, and thus was useful.59
The wholly artificial character of the National Liberation
Front, at least during the first year of its operation, is perhaps best
shown by the fact that until April 13, 1962, it had not disclosed the
names of its alleged leaders .... 60
In order to promote the concept that the Front and the Lao-
Dong Party were separate entities, Hanoi informed the world on
January 20, 1962, that a "conference of representatives of Marx-
ists-Leninists in South Viet-Nam" had taken place on December
19, 1961, in the course of which it was decided to set up the Viet-
Nam People's Revolutionary Party (Dang Nhan-Dan Cach Mang),
which officially came into existence on January 1, 1962....
[L]ike the National Liberation Front itself, the Revolutionary
Party failed to announce the names of any of its founding mem-
bers. According to two circulars emanating from the Lao-Dong
authorities and infiltrated into South Viet-Nam, members of the
Lao-Dong were notified as early as December 7, 1961 (twelve days
before the founding meeting) that the new party was created
merely out of tactical necessity but would remain under the over-
all control of the Lao-Dong....
In all likelihood, the establishment of a "separate" Communist
organization for South Viet-Nam follows the same pattern as the
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dissolution of the old ICP in the 1940's to give the Laotian and
Khmer Communist movements a semblance of national autonomy
61
In terms of its political-administrative apparatus, the South
Vietnamese insurgency operated until December, 1960, as simply
an extension of the then-existing Communist underground ap-
paratus....
Inside South Viet-Nam, the Viet-Minh seems to have main-
tained its old administrative structure of Interzones (lien-khu)
V and VI, the former covering Central Viet-Nam south of the 17th
parallel, and the latter covering the Nam-Bo (the southern part,
i.e., South Viet-Nam proper, or Cochinchina)....
On the military side, the two zone commanders are equals and
apparently get their orders directly from Hanoi. In 1960-62, they
were Brigadier General Nguyen Don for Interzone V and a "civil-
ian" guerrilla leader, Nguyen Huu Zuyen, for the Nam-Bo.02
Fall speaks of "Regiment 126, reinforced by a special 600-man bat-
talion, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in May, 1961, and likewise
operating in the mountains west of Quang-Ngai... ,03 and reports
that by mid-1963 infiltration may have involved 12,000 men."4 He also
points out that Americans were authorized to "shoot first" only in
February, 1963.5
United Nations Secretary General U Thant, although disagreeing
with those categorizing the National Liberation Front as a mere
"stooge" of Hanoi, nevertheless says that the N.L.F. receives "perhaps
very substantial help from the North."60 And according to Douglas Pike,
whom Arthur Schlesinger describes as the most careful student of the
Viet Cong,67 Hanoi was involved in the planning and direction of
61. Id. 357-58.
62. Id. 355 (emphasis added).
63. Id. 353.
64. Id. 330. Fall also writes that:
Close to 100,000 South Vietnamese of Communist obedience left the southern area
for North Viet-Nam, thus providing the latter with native southerners a plenty who
were given extensive training for later operations in their home areas; among them
were close to 10,000 mountaineers from the Central Plateau area. At the same time,
the repatriates going north included the dependents of the hard-core fighters who
were ordered to go underground in the south, as well as the raw recruits withd who-ce
training and protection the southerners had been burdened until then.
Id. 358-59.
65. Id. at 333.
66. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1967, at 4, col. 5.
67. A. SCHESINGER, T" Braa HERITAGE 18 (1967). Bernard Fall sa°s of Pike:
Pike's presence is one of those small illustrations of the good side of the American
system. No other book is likely to demolish more completely and more seriously all
the convenient myths dished out officially about the National Liberation Front (NLF).
for this is the work of an "insider." In his job Pike sees more material than anyone
except the Front Leaders themselves. He has read reports from captured Viet Congs.
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N.L.F. activities from the very beginning of the Front in 1959 and pro-
vided from the start what the N.L.F. most needed, organizational
knowhow and expertise in insurgency. 68 As Pike puts it, "By 1959 an
over-all directional hand was apparent. The struggle became an im-
ported thing." 69 By the end of 1963, there was evidence not only of the
translations of the huge quantities of captured documents . . . and publications
from Hanoi or from Front sources abroad.
Fall, The View from Vietnam, THE NEvW YoRK REVIEW OF Boos, Feb. 9, 1967, at 18, col. 2.
Although not all scholars agree with Douglas Pike's thesis "that the DRV was ... the
godfather of the NLF," see D. PiKE, ViEr CONG 321 (1966), most concede that the DRV
played a significant role in the development of the Front and that Hanoi provided signifi.
cant military leadership and assistance from about 1959-60.
According to Schesinger:
The civil insurrection in South Vietnam began to gather force by 1958; it was not
until September 1960 that the Communist Party of North Vietnam bestowed its
formal blessing and called for the liberation of the south from American imperialism,
Ho Chi Minh was now supplying the Viet Cong with training, equipment, strategic
advice and even men-perhaps two thousand a year by 1960.
A. SCHLESINGER, THE BITTER HERITAGE 17 (1967).
Bernard Fall rejects both the Lacouture-Devillers thesis that the insurgency began
"simply as an internal response to the repressive nature of the Diem regime" and the
"White Paper" thesis that the insurgency was instigated from the North. He adopts a
middle position which seems to concede that Hanoi played a significant role. See B. FALL,
VI=r-NA a WITNESS 130-32 (1966); M. RASIN & B. FALL, THE VImr-NAM READER 252-61
(Vintage ed. 1965). See also P. HONEY, supra note 37, at 25-26, 67-68.
Even Lacouture gives a chronology indicating D.R.V. intervention prior to major United
States expansion of forces. He writes: "[rin 1960 the N.L.F. had been created with the
authorization of Hanoi, which thus renounced its non-intervention; in 1961 the United
States entered the war." J. LAcouruRE, VmNAMx: BETwEEN Two TRucES 61 (Vintage ed.
1966).
Denis Warner's account of the beginning of the second Indo-China conflict indicates
that Hanoi played a significant role which preceded the first substantial United States
response in fate 1961 and early 1962 and that prior to that time Hanoi had "abandoned
any pretence that it was not behind the rising tide of violence." D. WARNER, TM LAST
CONFUCIAN 162 (Penguin ed. 1964); see also id. 160-76.
Brian Crozier's account strongly suggests that although the Viet Minh were a minority
when the second conflict broke out at the beginning of 1958, the North was substantially
directing the southern guerrillas prior to the end of 1961. He also says: "Indeed the
evidence of North Vietnamese direction and control of operations in South Vietnam is
overwhelming." B. CROZIER, supra note 47, at 137; see also id. 96-97, 135-43.
Professor Zasloff wrote in 1961 prior to major buildup of United States advisers in
South Viet Nam:
Currently the government of South Viet Nam is struggling for survival against
well-organized, strongly sustained guerrilla forces-the Viet Cong-inspired and sup-
ported by the Communist Vietminh government of the North, which has made no
secret of its goal of crushing the southern government and uniting Viet Nam under
its hegemony.
Zasloff, Peasant Protest in South Viet Nam, in M. KAPLAN, THE REvOLUTION IN WoRLD
POLITICS 192 (1966).
68. See D. PIKE, VIEr CoNG 77-84 (1966).
69, Id. 78. Pike also points out:
Mhe creation of the National Liberation Front, . . . was premeditated, planned,
organized at length and in detail, and then pushed and driven into existence and
operation. Such an effort had to be the child of the North.
Id. 80.
In differentiating the current Viet Nam conflict from the earlier Viet Minh war, Pike
s[y:he later strugle in the South had a distinct imported quality about it that did
not characterize either the Viet Minh war or the Communist revolution in China.
The alien character was not simply a matter of outside aid or leadership. The struggle
was in essence an expansionist drive by the North Vietnamese who asserted, and
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presence of two North Vietnamese generals in the South70 but northern
trained cadres were being captured in numbers.71 When the Viet Cong
buildup in mid-1964 made increased material support necessary, Hanoi
sent anti-aircraft and heavier weapons south.72 And according to Pike,
by the end of 1965 the N.L.F. was taken over by cadres from North Viet
Nam, even down to the village level, a regularizing process which began
in mid-1963. 73 There is evidence that regular units of the Army of
North Viet Nam were moving into the South-4 prior to commence-
ment of regular bombing of the North, and subsequent to 1965 it is
clear that such regular units were substantially engaged in the South."
The seriousness of this military threat is indicated by the Mansfield
Report which reported that at the time regular bombing of the North
began, South Viet Nam was in imminent danger of total collapse.70
This Viet Cong-North Viet Nam attack is the kind of serious and
sustained attack threatening political and territorial integrity which
justifies assistance to the South and an interdictive defensive response
against the territory of the North.
As a matter of policy preference, Professor Falk argues that in a
Type II conflict off-setting military assistance must be confined to the
internal arena as an alternative for limiting violence.77 This rationale
truly believed, that their goal of reunification was legally and morally justified.
Id. 53.
70. Id. 102.
71. Id. 323. In what he describes as a conservative estimate, accurrate within plus or
minus 10%., Pike sets out the following figures on infiltrators:
NLF Cadres from the North, 1954.1965
Year Number




1964 6,500 (at least a third Northerners)
1965 11,000 (almost all Northerners)
32,900
Id. 824.
72. Id. 321, 325.
73. Id. 116
74. See ,LsNsFmmL, Mustm, INouyo, AwEN & Boocs, TuE Vzar'sr Corucr. Tte Sun-
sTANCE AND THE SHADow-RE"ORTrO THE SFNATE ComirrmE o, Fo GNi RO ATO., 112
CONG. REc. 140, 141 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 1966); N.Y. Times, July 31, 1966, at 2, col. 5. See
also D. PiNE, Virr CoNc 164 (1966).
75. N.Y. Times correspondent Charles Mohr reported in August, 1966, that according
to informed sources the latest intelligence estimates indicated that".., of the 177 enemy
combat battalions in South Vietnam, 81, or 46 per cent, are nowv North Vietnamese....
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1966, at 1. col. 4, at 5, col. 5.
76. See MA~sFrir. et at., supra note 74, at 140.
77. See Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75
YALE L.J. 1122, 1123 (1966).
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is suspect as a blanket proposition and is especially weak as applied to
Viet Nam. North Viet Nam is not simply a third party state providing
assistance to a completely independent insurgency in "an internal
struggle for control" of another state. Falk's implicit characterization of
the conflict between North and South as "civil strife" or at least much
of the evidence that he relies on to characterize the conflict as Type
11178 suggests the obvious weakness of simply treating North Viet Nam
as a third party rendering assistance to an independent insurgency. But
in making the alternative Type II characterization of the conflict he
swings to the other extreme of minimizing the very important rela-
tionships between North and South-particularly the significant in-
terrelation between the National Liberation Front and the Communist
party apparatus of North Viet Nam. North Viet Nam is one half of
an at least de facto divided nation rendering assistance across an inter-
national cease-fire line to an armed insurgency in the other half whose
leadership is significantly interrelated with leadership in Hanoi. It is
generally believed that a more or less long run objective of that as-
sistance is to unify Viet Nam under the leadship of the Communist
party of Viet Nam, largely dominated by the North.79 North Vietnam-
ese Premier Pham Van Dong's reiterated goals of "freedom and in-
dependence" cannot be meaningfully interpreted as applying only to
North Viet Nam. Given the continuation of the struggle, they can only
be interpreted as signifying a wider intention encompassing South
Viet Nam as well. To assert that the war "should be viewed as primarily
between factions contending for control of the southern zone," is to
minimize this important relationship and objective of North Viet Nam
and indeed the whole background of the conflict. Real-world Viet Nam
will not fit either Falk's Type II or Type III paradigms, and certainly
cannot be both at once. Although the assistance from the territorially
adjacent North is covert and is supported by a substantial network of
indigenous guerrillas, the long run objectives of the North have sig-
nificant similarity with those of North Korea in the overt invasion of
South Korea. They are not simply those of a third party assisting state
such as the territorially remote assisting participants in the Spanish
78. See notes 15 & 45 supra.
79. According to Harrison Salisbury: "Both the Northern regime and the Liberation
Front are committed to reunification and the creation of a single Vietnamese state,"
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1, at 10, col. 3. But according to Wilfred Burchett:
"Reunification is a long-range project realizable only in the far distant future, which
Vietnamese leaders in the North and Liberation Front leaders in the South privately
agree may be 10 or 20 years away." Charlottesville Daily Progress, Feb. 10, 1967, at 1,
cols. 1-2. See also D. PIKE, ViEr CONG 367-71 (1966); A. EDEN, TOWARD PEACE IN INDO-
CHINA 21-22 (1966); P. HONEY, supra note 37, at 168-71.
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Civil War. Although, of course, there are many differences, the analogy
to the Korean War is for this reason alone closer than Professor Falk's
analogy to the Spanish Civil War.80 In determining permissibility of
defensive measures against the territory of an assisting participant the
objectives of the participant in rendering assistance and its relationship
to the insurgency are highly relevant. North Viet Nam is not simply
assisting in a struggle for "internal control" of the South but is sub-
stantially tied up with the military and political leadership of the
insurgency in the South and has as a major, although possibly long
term objective, unification with the South. This is not to argue the
extent of the military assistance Hanoi was providing in the early years.
The importance of the amount of that early assistance whether small
or large has been greatly oversold.8' But it is to indicate that prior to
regular interdictive attacks against the North, Hanoi was so involved
in the conflict in terms of its objectives in rendering assistance and its
interaction with the Viet Cong that it is anomalous to speak of it as
just a third party assisting state.
It should also be pointed out that there is conflicting evidence on the
extent to which Hanoi was the moving party in the effective insurgency
and that Professor Falk's model, which relies heavily on the controver-
sial Lacouture-Devillers thesis, is one which minimizes Hanoi's role.82
If a third state substantially initiates an insurgency instead of simply
rendering assistance to an on-going insurgency it would seem anoma-
lous to treat it as within Falk's Type II conflict. If the reality is that the
effective military insurgency in South Viet Nam was substantially in-
itiated and is substantially supported and directed by the Communist
party of Viet Nam largely controlled from Hanoi, Falk's view applied
to Viet Nam would simply immunize states invading covertly.
Further, even in a Type II paradigm, to restrict defensive response
to the internal arena may be an undesirable restriction of the right of
defense in the absence of a more effective peace-keeping machinery. It
80. See Falk, supra note 77, at 1126.
81. I share Schlesinger's judgment that the same is true of the failure to hold the 1956
elections. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 67, at 15.
82. Douglas Pike's overall thesis seems to assign a substantial role to Hanoi in the
creation of the effective military insurgency in the South, see D. PIFr, supra note 79, in
contrast to Professor Falk's "interpretation of the internal war as primarily a consequence
of indigenous forces." Falk, supra note 77, at 1129. The Canadian representative to the
I.C.C. concluded in a minority statement to the February 13, 1965, Special Report that
North Vietnamese activities "aimed at the overthrow of the South Vietnamese adminis.
tration . . . constitute the root cause of general instability in Vietnam ...... SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE Co-CHAMRzIEN OF THE GE'Na,'A CONFERENCE ON INDo-CIuNA, FsaUMARY 13,
1965 (Vietnam No. 1) CsND. No. 2609, at 14-15 (1965). For discussion of this 1963 Special
Report which was prompted by the commencement of regular bombing of the North see
Dai, supra note 46, at 171-72.
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would mean, in effect, that a state might have to endure interminable
outside intervention with little hope of ending the conflict by appropri-
ate defensive actions. Presumably under this thesis even a widely
recognized government could not defend its territory from massive
external military assistance to insurgent factions, because if it could it
would seem that assisting states participating in collective defense with
the state attacked should have the same defensive rights. Although
Falk's proposed rule might theoretically minimize international escala-
tion, it might also maximize destruction within the unfortunate in-
ternal arena that gets trappped as the battleground and it might
encourage external intervention in general. The Spanish Civil War
does show the great internal destructiveness of a territorially re-
stricted conflict in the absence of an effective sanction against in-
tervention. In a world relying heavily on power the right of effective
defense is a major deterrent to outside intervention in internal con-
flicts. Providing immunity to the real bases of power of the attackers
both fails to provide an effective sanction against third party assistance
and drastically undermines defensive rights. In doing so it closes out
an option which may in some situations be the most effective method
of conflict resolution at least cost to all participants. In the final analy-
sis that is the real question and one not convincingly answered by
Professor Falk's a priori "geographic" rule. For a number of reasons,
then, there is considerable question whether the proposal to immunize
the territories of intervening nations would in the long run reduce
conflict or whether it would increase conflict by encouraging inter-
vention and prolongation of conflict. Moreover, as the interdictive
response against North Viet Nam illustrates, the alternatives in pro-
ceeding against an aggressively assisting external power are consider-
ably greater than an either-or, all or nothing response. It might be that
enlightened community policy would rule impermissible all out attack
against the territorial and political integrity of such an assisting entity
while allowing necessary limited defensive measures against resources
closely related to the assistance. This alternative, which is the one be-
ing pursued in Viet Nam, stops short of ultimate escalation of the
conflict while providing some sanction against unlawful military
intervention.
There are sound reasons for suggesting, just as there are for doubt-
ing, that the limited bombing of the North may be an option leading to
termination of conflict in the shortest period of time at least cost to all
participants. Without the interdictive attacks against the North there
might be less reason for the North ever to stop rendering assistance to
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the insurgents or to seek a negotiated settlement. The cost of guerrilla
attack is by the lopsided arithmetic of such conflict much less than the
cost of defense. The interdictive attacks both substantially raise tie
cost of assistance to the insurgents in the South, and impede assistance
reaching the insurgents. They were initiated in close support of the
struggle in the South in terms of supply, morale and settlement factors
and do lend support to the defensive effort in these respects. To balance
the picture, though, it should be pointed out that as a strategy choice,
the effect of the bombing is difficult to assess and it has some serious
weaknesses. For example, it is unable to prevent a substantial flow of
assistance from reaching the South, it increases the risk of international
escalation, it may harden the attitude of the citizenry of the North,
and it has a strong negative effect on world opinion. In view of the
question marks connected with it, the limited bombing of the North
may or may not be the best strategy for pursuing legitimate defense
objectives in Viet Nam, but it is within the range of reasonable re-
sponses, allowing for supportable differences of opinion as to the ef-
fectiveness of a particular strategy for conflict termination.
At one point Professor Falk contends that "since the United States
has far greater military resources potentially available, our use of
insufficient force violates general norms of international law."'s But
surely it does not violate international law to take into account the
risk of escalation and of generating a nuclear war if the objective is
widened from limited defensive aims. His combined argument, then,
seems to be that given some United States response, international law
may require a greater military commitment in the South with no hope
of proceeding against the major resources in the North which are facili-
tating continuation of the struggle. By this observation Falk seems to
have put his finger on a major difficulty with his proposal for limiting
permissible response to the internal arena in Type II conflict. Since
international law does seek conflict minimization by a requirement of
effective force, shouldn't such force be applied against military re-
sources whether within or without the internal arena, if a determina-
tion is reasonably made that such response is necessary to end the
conflict with minimum destructiveness on all sides? This determination
must, of course, include assessment of the risk of conflict escalation
under each alternative and must be reasonable under all the circum-
stances, allowing some leeway for reasonable differences of opinion as
to the effectiveness of a particular strategy. But Falk's proposed terri-
83. See Falk, supra note 77, at 1144.
1077
The Yale Law Journal
torial limitation on responding defensive measures cuts down on a
series of options which may well lead to conflict resolution with mini-
mum destructiveness for all participants. The determination of what
course of action will end the conflict with minimum destructiveness
and risk is, of course, the real question and one which in the terribly
difficult Viet Nam context is not served by the sterile accusation that
Cour use of insufficient force violates general norms of international
law."
In view of Professor Falk's concern with conflict minimization
evident in his proposal to limit responding coercion to the internal
arena of a Type II conflict, it would also seem important to stress the
danger to world order in providing assistance to insurgents across an
international cease-fire line in a country at least de facto divided be-
tween the major contending public order systems. With respect to these
activities of the North, however, he merely says "international law
neither attempts nor is able to regulate support given exile groups. The
activities of Hanoi between 1954 and 1964 conform to patterns of
tolerable conflict in contemporary international politics."84 And he
concludes: "North Viet Nam's action does not seem to constitute 'ag-
gression.' "r As a description of power processes these statements may
be accurate, but as statements of contemporary international law and
policies of conflict minimization they are not the most useful picture.
The United Nations has repeatedly condemned the creation or sup-
port of civil strife by external elites using internal agents. Thus the
General Assembly said in condemning external assistance to the Com-
munist guerrillas in Greece:
84. Id. 1139.
This statement is also misleading in failing to, advert to Hanoi's activities with respect
to Laos during this period. North Vietnamese intervention in Laos has been on a substan-
tial scale, has not been confined to supporting exile groups and has been in flagrant
disregard of the Geneva Accords of 1962. Yet this intervention in Laos is in close support
of Hanoi's activities against South Viet Nam.
John Hughes, staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, writes from Laos
that:
Though Laos is technically neutralized by the Geneva agreement of 1962, It in fact
harbors what Premier Souvanna Phouma estimates to be 60,000 North Vietnamese
troops, who of course have no right to be on Laotian soil. In part they are stiffening
pro-Communist Pathet Lao units, but mainly they are support and garrison troops
down the length of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ensuring the continued passage through
Laos to South Vietnam of North Vietnamese infiltrators.
Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1967, at 1, col. 4. Some scholars indicate that Hanoi's
military intervention in South Viet Nam should be placed in a larger temporal and geo-
graphical context of Viet Minh aggression against Laos and Cambodia and the drive for
an all Indo-China Communist party dominated by Hanoi. See P. HONEY, supra note 37, at
168-71; B. CROZmR, supra note 47, at 114-33.
There is also evidence that North Viet Nam is providing training and assistance to in-
surgents operating in Thailand. See Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
85. Falk, supra note 77, at 1159.
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The General Assembly ... condemning the intervention of a
state in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose of
changing its government by the threat or use of force,
Solemnly reaffirms that whatever the weapons used, any aggres-
sion, whether committed openly or by fomenting civil strife in the
interest of a foreign power, or otherwise is the gravest of all crimes
against peace and security throughout the world.80
And the International Law Commission Draft of a Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind condemned:
The organization, or encouragement of the organization, by the
authorities of a state, of armed bands within its territory or any
other territory for incursions into the territory of another state;
or the toleration of the organization of such armed bands in its
own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of
its territory as a base of operation or as a point of departure for in-
cursions into the territory of another state as well as direct partic-
ipation in or support of such incursions.8 7
And as recently as December, 1966, the General Assembly "condemned
all forms of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, and urged
all States to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, terrorism,
or other indirect forms of intervention for the purpose of changing the
existing system of another State or interfering in civil strife in another
State."88 These representative pronouncements reflect the substantial
community expectation that inciting or assisting civil strife is not only
aggression, but is aggression presenting a particularly grave threat to
minimum order in today's world. In postulating that external military
assistance is inappropriate to influence the outcome in a Type III con-
flict, Falk seems to be concurring in this judgment although he later
somewhat inconsistently asserts that "international law offers no au-
thoritative guidance as to the use of force within South Viet Nam
.. "..",,9 The policy of conflict minimization strongly suggests the illegiti-
macy of military assistance to an insurgency sustained at a high level
of coercion across de facto boundaries separating major contending
public order systems.90 Should the West Germans or Nationalist Chi-
86. G.A. Res. 380 (v), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 13, 17, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). See
also A. THOM AS & A. THOMAs, NON-INTERVENM'oN 226-29 (1956).
87. International Law Commn, Report, 9 GAOR, Supp. 9 at 10, 11 U.N. Doc. A/2693
(1954).
88. U.N. Weekly News Siumary, Press Release IVS/273, at 6 (Decenibcr 22, 1966).
It is peripheral but perhaps useful to point out that the recognition of contending public
order systems does not depend on acceptance of dogma about "monolithic communiSM."
89. Falk, supra note 77, at 1155. See also id. 1137.
90. The interesting thesis of Robert Ardrey would to some extent seem to reinforce
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nese provide sustained high levels of military assistance to insurgents
in East Germany or mainland China, ultimately fielding regular army
units, the threat to world order would be obvious. And if the analogies
are not on all fours with Viet Nam, events in Viet Nam prove them
relevant if not as obvious with respect to consequences for public
order when such assistance is provided. In seeking to effectuate com-
munity policies of conflict minimization, it may be more effective to
focus attention on the illegality of aggressive coercive strategies across
de facto international boundaries rather than attempting to further
restrict the right of defense against such aggressive strategies.
External Participation in Intra-State Conflict: A Policy Inquiry
Even though Professor Falk's "civil strife" framework does not seem
sufficiently sensitive to crucial features of the total Viet Nam context
to provide a valid analytic base for conclusion about that conflict, his
framework is a creative contribution to stimulation of general policy
inquiry with respect to external participation in intra-state conflict.
Since his own conclusions about Viet Nam are based on this framework
it may be helpful to attempt further clarification of the major policies
applicable to external participation in intra-state conflict. This discus-
sion is intended only to air some doubts about suggested norms for
Type III conflict and is not intended to offer a definitive rule if, indeed,
any is possible or desirable. In fact, preliminary inquiry suggests that
"Type III conflict" may encompass too wide a variety of contexts
to generalize meaningfully and that more sensitive contextual clarifica-
tion may be desirable.
The principal policies relevant to decision about the permissibility
of external participation in intra-state conflict seem to be self-deter-
mination and maintenance of minimum public order. Self-determina-
tion, the right of peoples within an entity to choose their own
institutions and form of government, is a basic community policy re-
flected in community condemnation of intervention and colonialism.
The striking thing about self-determination as a touchstone of permis-
sibility is that realistically it may cut for as well as against outside
intervention in an internal arena and it may cut for or against assis-
tance to either insurgents or de facto government. In the colonial war
de facto control of territory as the important standard for purposes of conflict minimiza.
tion. See generally R. ARDREY, THE ThIToRIAL IMPERATIVE (1966).
Brownhe indicates that "the right of self-defence should be based upon peaceful posses-
sion and de facto exercise of authority." I. BRoWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIlt USE OF
FORCE BY STATEs 382 (1963).
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in Algeria in 1960 self-determination may have been served by as-
sistance to insurgents whereas in the Congo in 1961, in Greece in
1948, in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in 1964, and possibly at the
beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, self-determination may
have been better served by assistance to the government. A simplistic
version of self-determination espoused by Hall9' and advocated by
some, however, identifies self-determination with anything that hap-
pens in an entity. According to this view, states should be left alone in
all circumstances to work out their own form of government. If aid to
the recognized government were legitimate then it would impair the
right to revolution and if aid to the insurgents were legitimate it would
violate independence by interfering with the regular organ of the
state. This judgment that self-determination requires that neither the
recognized government nor insurgents can ever be aided conceals the
naive assumption that whatever takes place within the confines of a
territorial entity is pursuant to genuine self-determination of peoples
and that outside "intervention" is necessarily disruptive of self-deter-
mination. Such simplistic deductive notions that territorial entities
should be left alone to work out their own self-determination at all
costs and by any modalities ignores the twin reality that today ruthless
governments in control of the total resources of a society can suppress
their peoples and that minorities can through terror, sabotage and the
control of the military establishment capture control of governmental
machinery. The Hall view seems to adopt a kind of Darwinian defini-
tion of self-determination as survival of the fittest within the national
boundaries, even if fittest means most adept in the use of force.
It may be that proscribing unilateral outside assistance to either
faction will in fact result more often in genuine self-determination
than allowing such assistance to either side. And the difficulty of ap-
praising objectives of the assisting participants and determining where
self-determination really lies may militate for this solution. If these
assumptions really underlie a neutral rule of nonintervention in Type
III conflicts, then we ought to recognize it as such and reflect both on
the accuracy of the assumptions and on whether it is necessary to have
this broad a prophylactic rule. Some relevant questions might be:
What is the aggregate contemporary experience as to whether self-
determination is aided or hindered by assistance to insurgents, by as-
sistance to recognized governments, or by both? In what cases would a
91. See NV. HALL, INTr.ATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 1909); IV. HALL, I-amRATIONAL LW
347 (8th ed. 1924).
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broad prophylactic rule cut against self-determination and might we
find recurring features which would signal an exception to the rule in
those cases? In light of the great variety of situations presenting the
problem, what is the criterion for "civil strife" triggering the rule?
What functions do recognized governments serve that might make any
such rule as to them more difficult or unworkable? Might legitimacy
of aid to either faction be conditioned on holding free elections or on
some other indicia of genuine self-determination? In view of the in-
terdependencies among states in a world divided between contending
states and blocs, to what extent is a rule focused on self-determination
of only one entity realistic or desirable?92 What are the expectations
that nations will observe such rules? Answers to these questions might
militate for no rule, a neutral non-intervention rule or a more nar-
rowly drawn rule aimed, for example, at assistance to insurgents. But
without more the present arguments for a neutral non-intervention
rule in all Type III conflicts are unpersuasive as a requirement of self-
determination.
As seems implicit in the suggested norm for Type II conflict, any
rule of non-intervention based on self-determination should be modi-
fied where one participant has received external assistance. Although
self-determination might still cut either way, the rule is much too
suspect to operate as a prophylactic rule against external intervention
after there has already been intervention on one side.
A second major policy in analyzing the permissibility of external
participation in intra-state conflict is the maintenance of minimum
public order. An hypothesis for inquiry with respect to public order
consequences is that external assistance to insurgent groups and the
fomenting of civil strife by external elites is more often seriously dis-
ruptive of minimum public order than assistance to recognized govern-
ments. Assistance to insurgents often involves high risk of prolonged
conflict with entrenched elites as well as high risk of expansion of the
conflict through external support for the recognized government. Rec-
ognized governments may be incorporated in a world order bloc that
views their overthrow as an unacceptable impairment of bloc power
or security or they may have defensive arrangements with third powers
which will be triggered by assistance to insurgents. It is one of the
functions of government to preserve stability and maintain inter-
92. Professor Falk adverts to this question in pointing out that "the outcome of a Type
III conflict may affect the relative power of many other countries." Falk, supra note '7,
at 1126.
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nal order and it is to be expected that ruling elites will resist change
sought through force and will call on their established international
partners to help them. Recognized governments usually control
greater resources than insurgents and frequently control the orga-
nized military. These conditions make insurgent attacks employ-
ing guerrilla armies and terrorist tactics likely to be prolonged
costly struggles. Compare, for example, such diverse situations as
Hungary and the Dominican Republic with Algeria and Viet Nam.
Moreover, fomenting an insurgency, or providing assistance to it in
early stages, can be simply a sophisticated form of attack. Such attacks
are particularly pernicious in that they are difficult to prove and are
frequently couched in rhetoric about self-determination and social
reform which may or may not be the principal objectives of the at-
tacker.
As a rule to prevent outside powers from becoming involved with
one another, there is little reason to believe that a "neutral" norm
would be more effective than a rule prohibiting external assistance to
insurgencies only. In fact, in the cold war context there is good reason
to believe that it is particularly unrealistic to ask that military aid be
withheld from continuing de facto governments. Soviet assistance to
the regimes in Hungary and East Germany and United States assistance
to Greece and South Viet Nam indicate that realistic projections mili-
tate against attempting to proscribe assistance to entrenched govern-
ments. In contrast, expectations of violence are particularly acute when
assistance is rendered to insurgent elements across cold war boundaries.
Determined United States assistance to Hungarian freedom fighters
would have involved high risk of acute conflict with Russia. North
Vietnamese assistance to insurgents in South Viet Nam has fueled a
major conflict. And substantial military assistance by Formosa to main-
land insurgents would seem to carry an especially grave risk of major
war. It is an observable cold war phenomenon that major powers tend
to support regimes threatened by military actions initiated or sup-
ported by opposing bloc powers. In light of this practice there is cer-
tainly a strong community interest in not attempting coercive change
across such boundaries.
In contrast, public order consequences are not as acute in situations
of less direct cold war confrontation. For example, in newly indepen-
dent African countries intervention by a former colonial power on
either side may not provide the same risk of protracted and escalating
conflict although the risk of extended conflict is still significant and
would usually be greater if intervention were on the side of the insur-
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gents. Where the risk of major conflict is slight, grave and continuing
denial of self-determination may outweigh dangers of the use of coer-
cive strategies of change. But where such risk is grave, minimum public
order may be the most important consideration.
It may be argued that since both sides may recognize separate elite
groups as the lawful representative of the state, if any rule is to be ef-
fective in preventing outside powers from confronting each other on
separate sides of a civil war, the rule must proscribe assistance to both
government and insurgents. But although states can always prema-
turely recognize one or another group as the legal representative of a
state, there is usually no doubt as to which side is the government and
which the insurgents despite such opposing recognition. In Greece,
Algeria, Spain, the Congo, South Viet Nam, Venezuela, Cuba, Colom-
bia and Thailand, to name a few past and present trouble spots, there
can be little doubt which authority was the real-world government.
The situation of contending governments without territorial separa-
tion and both with approximately equal credentials in terms of past
legitimacy, de facto governmental control and international recogni-
tion doesn't seem to be the major "civil strife" problem. Even if this
were a problem one criterion for assistance to a government should be
that it is the only widely recognized de facto or de jure government. t
A rule of no assistance to either faction also runs into the problem
that it is a not uncommon practice to enter into treaty arrangements
with a widely recognized government to assist it in maintaining the
existing form of government against external attack or internal sub-
version. This practice reflects the real interdependencies felt among
nations. Query whether assistance to a recognized government should
be impermissible if pursuant to such a pre-existing treaty of guarantee
or assistance or whether failure to honor such a treaty would itself
amount to intervention? A major difference between the insurgents
and government is that the government is the internationally autho-
rized agency to receive external assistance. To prohibit such assistance
is more difficult than proscribing assistance to insurgents. There are
at least two other reasons for this greater difficulty in addition to the
problem of pre-existing treaties. First, since the recognized government
93. A related question is to what extent assistance to exile groups such as the Bay -of-
Pigs exiles or the South Vietnamese that had gone North in 1954 is legitimate in situations
where assistance to insurgents would be otherwise illegitimate. Although this circumstance
may somewhat strengthen claims from the standpoint of self-determination, it is hardly
decisive of genuine self-determination and has only peripheral relevance with respect to
the policy of minimum public order.
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is the international agency of the state entitled to receive assistance, it
is legitimate even under a "neutral" norm to render assistance prior to
"civil strife." Under this norm, then, a difficult fact determination
must be made as to when "the outcome is uncertain"T or "dvil strife"
or "belligerency" or "insurgency" or some such cabalistic point has
been reached before assistance becomes impermissible. By that point
an assisting state may already feel committed. It is probably unrealistic
to assume that assistance will often be stopped after once being legiti-
mately begun, particularly if the facts are at all hazy, as they usually
are. Moreover, could levels of assistance provided prior to "civil strife"
be continued as, for example, the Military Assistance Advisory Group
in Viet Nam? Must they be, on the theory that a reduction amounts to
intervention on the side of the insurgents? And if some level of assis-
tance is permissible or mandatory, is it realistic to argue that it cannot
be increased?
This picture is further complicated with respect to assistance to the
government forces in that one of the functions of the government is to
maintain order within the community. Although at some point one
can philosophically argue that maintenance of order must yield to the
right to revolution, until that point is reached external assistance may
be consistent with internal autonomy. Because of this function of
government within the internal arena, as well as its function as inter-
national representative of the state, there is likely to be great difficulty
in determining when the level of "civil strife" is such that assistance is
violative of internal autonomy. Secondly, since under Professor Falk's
framework assistance to a recognized government becomes legitimate
again after significant military assistance has been received by the in-
surgents, another difficult determination must be made as to when such
assistance has been rendered. But because of the difficulty of proving
covert assistance to the insurgents, as Viet Nam aptly demonstrates,
assistance to the recognized government even if legitimately provided
in a Type II situation is likely to remain shrouded in controversy and
condemned as much as, or more than (because more visible) assistance
to the insurgents. Query also whether Professor Falk intends that off-
setting assistance to insurgents would be permissible as a Type II con-
flict after the recognized government has received assistance? This
would be the ultimate in "neutral" rules. Under such a rule almost any
situation could become open-ended. For since the recognized govern-
94. See generally Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 An. J. frr". L.
112, 121-22 (1959).
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ment is entitled to receive assistance prior to civil strife, external elites
assisting both sides will point out that the other side's aid legitimates
their own. It would seem then that an effective rule for conflict mini-
mization must at least proscribe counter-intervention (legitimate in
Type II conflict) on behalf of insurgents.
Because of the real functions of recognized governments any attempt
to fashion "neutral" rules treating the government and insurgents
alike is suspect. There are some reasons for suggesting that a rule pre-
venting assistance to insurgents only might be a more realistic and no
less efficacious rule in many contexts than a rule preventing assistance
to both factions. Such a rule might also desirably focus attention on the
probably greater threat of providing assistance to foment civil strife as
compared with assistance to a widely recognized government.
Although scholars are divided on the permissibility of assistance to
the two sides in Professor Falk's Type III conflict, the area of disagree-
ment significantly reflects the greater danger to world order of pro-
viding assistance to insurgents rather than to a widely recognized
government. There are a number of writers who take the position that
international law does not prohibit assistance to a recognized govern-
ment in a Type III conflict, and there are substantial community ex-
pectations that such assistance is permitted eVen if its purpose is to
assist in suppressing civil strife.05 There is, on the other hand, wider
agreement that assistance to insurgents is impermissible.0
Although exploration of the role of international law in dealing
with "civil strife" will not by itself result in valid answers for Viet
Nam, such exploration is relevant to the Viet Nam problem. A pre-
liminary attempt to clarify community policies most relevant to con-
texts of "civil strife" indicates that the "civil strife" structures relied
on to condemn United States policy in Viet Nam are over-simplified
-even if Viet Nam could be treated as "civil strife". Professor Falk's
Type III conflict encompasses a range of different contexts from colo-
nial wars to "wars of national liberation" and it may be preferable that
95. See the authorities collected in Moore & Underwood, The Lawfulness of United
States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam, 112 CONG. REc. 14,943, 14,975-76 n.179 (daily
ed. July 14, 1966). and the discussion in Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to
the Republic of Viet-Nam, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 28-32 (1967).
96. See the authorities cited in note 95, supra.
In the context of Viet Nam, whatever assistance to insurgents might otherwise be
permissible is dearly prohibited by the express provisions of Articles 19 and 24 of the
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. In its 1962 Special Report, the International
Control Commission found that "there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable
doubt" that North Viet Nam had violated these provisions. SPECIAL REPORT T o Til Co.
CHAIR-IEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA (Vietnam No. 1), CMND, No. 1755
(1962). 31 PARtL. SESSIONAL PAPEEts 7 (1961-62).
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resulting norms be more contextually discriminating. That genuine
self-determination requires in situations of "civil strife" that assistance
never be provided either insurgents or the government is questionable.
With respect to the policy of minimum order, assistance to insurgents
seems considerably more dangerous than assistance to a widely recog-
nized government. This difference and realism about cold war expecta-
tions suggest that at least in inter-bloc contexts it may be prefer-
able to have a norm condemning unilateral assistance to insurgents
and thereby focusing attention on the greater threat rather than at-
tempting to prohibit assistance to both widely recognized governments
and insurgents. Community expectations more dearly condemning
such assistance to insurgents and problems implicit in the functions of
the recognized government also militate for distinguishing between
assistance to insurgents and widely recognized governments. Whatever
the ultimate solution, if any in terms of such rules, the assistance of the
United States to South Viet Nam would seem to be a permissive de-
fensive response to at least off-set substantial military assistance pro-
vided to the Viet Gong. North Vietnamese assistance to the Viet Gong,
however, exceeds tolerable levels of inter-bloc coercion and is an im-
permissive strategy of attempted change.
In appraising the role of international law in intra-state conflict,
clarification of the process side-the international machinery and
procedures to control conflict-is as deserving of attention as norma-
tive clarification. Substantial progress toward the rule of law in large
measure depends on more effective centralized or regional peace-
keeping machinery. Effective regional organizations able to make
authoritative fact determinations and to authorize collective action to
keep the peace would go far to alleviate the problem of regulating ex-
ternal participation in intra-state conflict. The United Nations Congo
and Cyprus operations show that in some contexts (principally char-
acterized by an absence of high order conflict between the major com-
peting ideological systems) the United Nations can be an effective
participant in controlling such conflict. It is important that these hope-
ful precedents be strengthened and it is tragic that the United Nations
has been unable to significantly moderate the Viet Nam conflict. Cer-
tainly every effort should continue to be made to strengthen its role.
But emphasis on the process side, however necessary for achieving more
effective control of international coercion, should not obscure funda-
mental differences in attitudes of major participants regarding existing
peacekeeping machinery. Although the United States has formally
placed before the Security Council a draft resolution calling for im-
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mediate negotiations without preconditions and indicating willingness
to achieve the purpose of the resolution by arbitration or mediation, 9
Hanoi and Peking have consistently rejected any role for the United
Nations in settling the Viet Nam war.08 Similarly, emphasis on the
process side should not downgrade the relevance of the existing norma-
tive structure. We have not yet attained an ideal world and in the
absence of a more effective peacekeeping process the existing normative
structure condemning force as a strategy of major international change
and preserving the right of defense against major military attack re-
mains the principal framework for appraisal of the Viet Nam war.
The State Department Brief in Context
One of the principal strengths of an approach to foreign relations
which inquires of "international law" as opposed to the neo-realist
97. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1966, at 12, cols. 2-6.
98. Secretary General U Thant said at a news conference on February 24, 1965:
The government of North Viet-Nam has all along maintained that the United
Nations is not competent to deal with the question of Viet-Nam since, in its view,
there is already in existence an international machinery established in 1954 in Geneva,
They have all along maintained that position and, as you all know, it is a position
also maintained by the Peoples Republic of China. As far as the United Nations Is
concerned, I think the greatest impediment to the discussion of the question of Viet.
Nam in one of the principal organs of the United Nations is the fact that more than
two parties directly concerned in the question are not members of this organization.
I therefore do not see any immediate prospect of useful discussion in the Security
Council ....
Press Conference, Feb. 24, 1965, quoted in M. RASKIN & B. FALL, TuE ViLr-NA,%t REAlrn
263, at 267 (Vintage ed. 1965).
As stated by Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese position is:
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that . . . any
approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also
inappropriate because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva
Agreements on Vietnam.
RECENT EXCHANGES CONCERNING ATTFrirs TO PROMOTE A NEGOTIATED SETrLEMENT OF THE
CONFLICr IN ViEr-NAm (Viet-Nam No. 3) CMND. No. 2756, at 51 (1965). Hanoi reiterated
this stand by way of public reply to the March 14th peace proposals of Secretary General
U Thant. The public statement of Hanoi asserted:
[I]t is necessary to underline once again the views of the Government of Hanoi,
which has pointed out that the Viet-Nam problem has no concern with the United
Nations and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way in
the Viet-Nam question.
56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 618 (1967).
Peking militantly declares:
The United Nations has never taken a just stand on the Viet Nam question. It has
absolutely no say concerning a settlement of the South Viet Nam question. .
U.N. intervention in affairs of Indo-China cannot be tolerated ...
We would like to advise U Thant: save yourself the trouble. There is nothing for
the United Nations to do in Viet Nam, neither is it qualified to do anything there.
kxtract from an article in the Peking Peoples' Daily "Serious Advice for U Thant con.
tained in RECENT EXCHANGES, supra, 54-55.
It might also be noted that Hanoi refused to submit the Tonkin Gulf incident to
Security Council investigation despite a South Viet Nam request and offer to send
a delegation to the Security Council to participate in debates on the incident. See Moore &
Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nan, 112
CONG. REC. 14,943 (daily ed. July 14, 1966), reprinted in DUQUESNE L. REv. 235 (1967), at
note 228 and accompanying text.
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preoccupation with "the national interest"09 is that a balanced inter-
national law approach seems to achieve a real focus on clarification of
long run community interest. The kinds of questions focused on in
this legal dialogue-regulation of international use of force and regu-
lation of external participation in internal strife-achieve a different
focus from realpolitik discussions of the same problems and as such add
an additional dimension to the policy considerations available to the
national decision maker. In these inquiries policy justification is not
principally short run national interest but common and long run
community interest. Legal discourse can also aid in evaluating legal
arguments made by the adversaries and used as the basis of attacks on
or justification for national policy, for example North Viet Nam's as-
sertion that it has a legal right to use force against South Viet Nam. A
balanced international law approach, one neither unduly focusing on
"legal idealism"'10 nor "naked power"' 0 1 and not legalistically self-
limiting, is relevant to problems such as Viet Nam. Because of this
relevance, I share Professor Falk's view that inquiry of international
law is an important and helpful inquiry for the national decision maker
and that international law should not be used by either side solely to
"bolster or bludgeon foreign policy positions .. .. "102 Professor Falk's
criticism of the State Department brief as "formalistic" and "legalistic"
and as responding to irrelevant and trivial points, 0 3 however, is unfair
without further exposition of the context in which it was written. As
he points out, the State Department brief was principally written in
response to arguments made in the Lawyers' Committee Memoran-
dum'04 which had been widely circulated in the United States and to
similar legal arguments which were being made by some members of
Congress. Many of the legal arguments made in the Lawyers' Commit-
tee Memorandum and in Congress against the United States position,
such as the arguments that a member of the United Nations can not
collectively assist in defense of a non-member and that it is unconstitu-
tional to commit United States armed forces to South Viet Nam with-
99. See H. MORGmEHAU, PoLrncs AmONG NATIoNs 227-33, 275-311 (3d ed. 1960); H.
MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF Tim NATIONAL LyrEsr (1951); Morgenthau, To Internene
or Not to Intervene, 45 FORMGN AEFAms 425 (1967).
100. This is a sound admonition from George Kennan. See generally G. K AMxt-
icAN DIPLOMiACY 1900-1950 (1951).
101. See, e.g., H. MoRGENTnu, supra note 99.
102. See Falk, supra note 77, at 1155. See also Meeker, Role of Law in Political Aspects
of World Affairs, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 83 (1963).
103. Falk, supra note 77, at 1139, 1146, 1155.
104. Memorandum of Law of Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward
Vietnam, reprinted in 112 CONG. REc. 2552-59 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
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out a formal congressional declaration of war, were legalistic in the
extreme. They were also inaccurate, and Falk properly repudiates
them.105 Such arguments had achieved a wide hearing, however, and
were given substantial credence by many laymen and even some mem-
bers of the bar. In fact, the "word magic" of the article 51 collective
defense argument was still a major tenet of arguments against lawful-
ness made by the Chairman of the Lawyers' Committee in an article in
the American Bar Association Journal as late as July, 1966.100 More-
over, a number of outstanding international legal scholars, including
Professor Falk, had become associated with the Lawyers' Committee
efforts and by their association lent credence to these and other legalis.
tic arguments made in the Memorandum.0 7 Because of this widespread
credence which the adversary arguments of the Lawyers' Committee
achieved, and their use as a basis for criticizing Viet Nam policy, they
needed reply if there was to be balanced appraisal of the issues. The
State Department brief performed that function. And although Pro.
fessor Falk emphasizes the adversary nature of the State Department
brief he does not point out that the Lawyers' Committee Memorandum
was at least an equally adversary document. Candor would suggest
acknowledgment that both sides in the Viet Nam debate have tended
to take adversary positions. 08
105. See Falk, supra note 77, at 1139-40, 1154.
106. See Standard, United States Intervention in Vietnam Is Not Legal, 52 A.B.A.J.
627 (1966).
107. See Letter from the Lawyers' Committee to President Lyndon D. Johnson, Jan. 25,
1966, reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 2551-52 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). Professor Falk Is cur.
rently Chairman of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers' Committee. The work of
the Consultative Council has been somewhat better than the earlier much circulated
Lawyers' Committee efforts but is still essentially a one-sided argument.
For an example, see The Military Involvement of the United States In Vietnam,
A Legal Analysis (1966).
Scholars certainly have a duty to appraise the activities of their own as well as foreign
governments. See generally Finman & Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests
and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 632. The point is simply that the
wide circulation of the Lawyers' Committee Memorandum, endorsed by leading Inter.
national law scholars and accompanied by the vocal theories of some Congressmen,
created public attitudes about a number of legal points which it was hardly Irrelevant
or trivial to rebut. The legalistic "decaration of war' and "non-member " arguments were
two of the principal arguments against lawfulness held out to the public.
108. Even the latest Lawyers' Committee efforts can only be fairly described as ad-
versary in nature. See The Military Involvement of the United States in Vietnam: A
Legal Analysis, supra note 107, and the nearly full-page advertisement "U.S. Intervention
in Vietnam is Illegal," N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1967, at E 9.
According to a 1965 report of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers,
apparently circulated principally in Europe, the Lawyers' Committee Memorandum was
"distributed to 250,000 American lawyers." The Return of an I.A.D.L. Delegation from
Vietnam, 1965, at 9 (unpublished manuscript). An advertisement of the Lawyers' Com-
mittee puts the distribution figure at 173,000 lawyers. THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 1967,
at 29. The advertisement also boasts distribution of 23,000 reprints of the N.Y. Times
advertisement. Id.
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It is perhaps inevitable in any on-going national dialogue with the
importance of the Viet Nam debate that both sides will appeal as ad-
versaries to legal arguments. Perspectives about authority are important
in evaluating the wisdom of policies, and both proponents and op-
ponents characteristically invoke legalities. The administration stress
on the "obligation" arising from the SEATO Treatyoa and the critics
"non-member" argument are examples of attempts to invoke authority
for contending foreign policy positions. When such appeals are made,
the importance of perspectives about authority in shaping national
policy make it important for legal scholars and advisors to point out
essential discrepancies. In doing so they should recognize that they are
performing only one task of the scholar or adviser and that, to the extent
possible, clarification of community policies prior to decision may be
a more important task.
The Vestiges of a Constitutional Attack
Although Professor Falk rejects the early Lawyer's Committee argu-
ments that the President has no consitutional authority to use American
military forces in Viet Nam without a declaration of war," 0 he contends
that:
The President has the constitutional authority to commit our
armed services to the defense of South Viet Nam without a declara-
tion of war provided that such "a commitment" is otherwise in
accord with international law. Whether all or part of the United
States action violates international law is also a constitutional ques-
tion.... [T]he bombing of North Viet Nam appears to be an un-
constitutional use of Presidential authority as well as a violation
of international law."'
In this watered down form, Falk's somewhat monistic argument pre-
sents no independent grounds for unconstitutionality but depends in
the first instance on the establishment of an international violation. And
109. The real force underlying the "obligation" argument is that United States actions
with respect to Viet Nam have over a period of more than twelve years created sub-
stantial and very real expectations on the part of many Vietnamese and other Asians
that the United States will assist in the defense of South Viet Nam. The SEATO Treaty
was one such act both embodying and creating these expectations. SEATO grew out
of the defeat of the French in the first Indo-China war, and historically has been
intimately associated with the Viet Nam problem. See A. EDEn, FuLL Cmcs. 148-49,
158-63 (1960).
110. Falk, supra note 77, at 1154. Professor Quincy Wright seems to substantially
agree with Falk. "The issue seems unimportant in view of the broad Constitutional powers
of the President to use armed force without Congressional support or declaration of
war." Wright, Legal Aspects of the viet-Nam Situation, G0 Ams. J. line'. L 750, 763 (19q.
111. Falk, supra note 77, at 1155.
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in postulating that international violation is a sufficient condition for
constitutional violation the argument is erroneous. The international
and constitutional consequences of exercise of the foreign relations
power are not identical. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may constitutionally override valid treaties by later inconsistent legis-
lation even though the later enactment would be a violation of inter-
national law.112 These holdings are particularly relevant in light of the
congressional authorization for executive use of the armed forces in
Viet Nam, making such action in fact executive-congressional action.11
The Executive and Congress substantially exercise the foreign affairs
power of the nation and it is not clear that they are ever acting un-
constitutionally solely because of violation of international norms.
And if there is any authority that such action is necessarily unconstitu-
tional Professor Falk does not share it with us.
It is one thing to recognize that customary and treaty norms of in-
ternational law are part of "the law of the land" under Article VI for
the purpose of binding the states (which essentially have no inde-
pendent foreign relations power), and quite another to argue, as Pro-
fessor Falk must under his thesis, that this article constitutionally
restricts the exercise of the foreign relations power of the United States.
It may be that in some contexts or when dealing with some types of in-
ternational norms Congress or the Executive should be so restricted,
but Professor Falk offers no constitutional standards as to what those
contexts are. Some major problems which would have to be explored
before his thesis could be applied to Viet Nam, even assuming inter-
national violation, are: What is the constitutional effect of the con-
gressional authorization of the use of armed forces in Viet Nam by the
Southeast Asia Resolution and other congressional actions with respect
to Viet Nam? How do the "political question" problems affect the im-
pact of this thesis?" 4 And in what circumstances is it feasible or de-
sirable to compel judicially changes in foreign policy because of an
asserted violation of international law? As it stands, Professor Falk's
112. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888); Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions,"
104 U. PA. L. REv. 451, 487-90 (1956). For an illustration from Great Britain, see Mortensen
v. Peters, 14 Scots L.T. 227 (1906).
113. For an -analysis of the lawfulness of United States assistance to South Viet Nam
under internal constitutional processes and a review of congressional action authorizing
and affirming United States assistance, see Moore & Underwood, The Lawfulness of United
States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam, 112 Coc. REc. 14,943, 14,960-67, 14,983.89
(daily ed. July 14, 1966).
114. See generally Dickinson, supra note 112.
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constitutional argument is even more unpersuasive than the earlier
"declaration of war" argument which he rejects.
Conclusion
The persistence of competing models of the Viet Nam conflict sug-
gests that the conflict cannot be meaningfully generalized in black and
wvhite terms. Real-world Viet Nam is unalterably ambiguous, and
writers on both sides do not perform a service when they assume a cer-
tainty and simplicity that does not exist. Although the conflict is not
solely a product of "aggression from the North," the substantial inter-
action between Hanoi and the Viet Cong, the historical background of
the conflict, and the objectives of Hanoi in supporting the sustained
attack also belie meaningful characterization as civil strife. And Hanoi's
unwillingness to negotiate mutual withdrawal from the South in the
face of repeated United States declarations of willingness to promulgate
a time table for withdrawal does not support a model which portrays
Hanoi as merely concerned with offsetting United States assistance.
If because of Viet Nam Americans are asking themselves hard ques-
tions about the use of national power and the goals of foreign policy,
the North Vietnamese must ask themselves hard questions about the
use of force as an instrument of major international change. At some
point it seems probable that this introspection will yield to a negotiated
settlement. Neither side seems to have sufficient usable military and
political power to win decisive victory short of a protracted struggle at
great human and material cost. Secretary General U Thant is right both
in perception and in emphasis when he terms the Viet Nam war ba-
sically a political problem that can only be solved by a political settle-
ment. This, however, is a stricture that both sides must be willing to
accept and to date the North Vietnamese have shown but flickers of
interest in such a settlement. Despite this hard line from Hanoi, the
United States must continue to emphasize a negotiated solution to the
conflict and must energetically exploit any interest in negotiated settle-
ment shown by participants in the opposing camp. A negotiated peace
is the only alternative to a prolonged and increasingly dangerous con-
flict.
Emphasis on negotiated settlement should not obscure the fact that
the conflict did not merely arise by accident, but that it reflects major
differences in objectives of the contending participants and a value
structure in Hanoi which exhibits greater willingness to achieve ex-
tension of its values by force. North Vietnamese disregard of this basic
proscription against unilateral change by force is central to the conflict
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in Viet Nam. At Potsdam Stalin promised that Korea would be divided
only temporarily, n1 5 but when temporary occupation of the north
turned into permanent communization South Korea did not militarily
attack across a major cold war dividing line despite United Nations
support for a unified Korea. Such an attack from South Korea, like
military assistance from North Viet Nam, could have been expected to
trigger major conflict. The parallel, like all foreign affairs analogy, is
not exact, but the contrast accurately points up a fundamental de-
parture by North Viet Nam and those nations supporting it from the
basic principle of the United Nations Charter outlawing war as an
instrument of national policy. Acceptance by all nations of that funda-
mental requirement of minimum public order is a crucial first step
toward a world community able to set aside its differences and get on
with the real task of applying its immense resources to the alleviation
of poverty, ignorance, and disease.
115. S. MORMON, THE OxroRD HISTORY OF THE AMEIcAN PEOPLE 1065 (1965).
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